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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Currently, multi-unit site risk is not being formally nor adequately considered in either 
the regulatory or the commercial nuclear environment [1, 2, 3], despite the fact that the 
question of multi-unit accidents is not one of possibility, but of probability [3]. These 
types of accidents are significant and do need to be addressed [3]. Fleming, Arndt, 
Omoto, Jung, et al. have recommended ideas to deal with different facets of a multi-unit 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) [3, 4, 5, 6]; however, there are still no well-
established, comprehensive methods for considering multi-unit site dependencies when 
creating a PRA [7].  
In the regulatory arena, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been 
discussing how to address the issue of multi-unit nuclear power plant PRAs for many 
years. After the Chernobyl accident, the 1981 lessons learned report included four 
recommendations that dealt with multi-unit accidents. Many of these recommendations 
came about because noble gas and airborne volatiles were found to have been transported 
to the other three units onsite during the accident through a shared ventilation system. It 
was recommended that control room habitability, contamination outside of the control 
room, smoke control, and shared shutdown systems be looked at more fully [8]. Then, in 
1995, the Commission committed to expand the uses of PRA [9]. For several years, the 
conversation did not focus on multi-unit PRA; however, discussions began again in 2002 
and 2003 and resulted in a 2005 NRC staff recommendation to the Commission to 
endorse an integrated risk analysis [10, 11, 12]. The NRC staff presented the Commission 
with three options to deal with this so-called integrated risk: 1) take no action, 2) quantify 
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the integrated risk at the site for new reactors that were being built, or 3) quantify the risk 
for all reactors at a site. The staff recommended that the Commission choose Option 3, 
which would require nuclear power plants to quantify the risk of all units on a reactor site 
[12]. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) suggested, however, that 
quantifying the integrated risk from all new reactors onsite would be a better option. In 
the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM), the Commission directed the staff to create 
an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) and to consider the ACRS’s 
recommendations [13]. Also in 2005, the staff recommended that any modular reactor 
designs should account for the integrated risk posed at multi-unit sites. In 2006, the NRC 
staff returned with the ANPR and noted that they would be discussing the issue of 
integrated risk with external stakeholders [14]. The result of all this was NUREG-1860, 
which presented an approach to integrated risk that only necessitated that the risk from 
new reactors be “limited” and did not provide prescriptive guidelines [15]. In 2008, the 
NRC also indicated that it would be creating loss of offsite power (LOOP) models for its 
Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) program that would address multi-unit effects 
[16], but such a model is not yet complete. Currently, the NRC is in the early stages of an 
effort to create an integrated Level 3 PRA that includes the effects of multiple units, as 
well as the risk from all radiation sources onsite, such as the spent fuel pool [17].  
In the nuclear industry, many advances have been made in multi-unit risk analysis; 
however, solutions generally focus on only one facet of the PRA at a time and do not 
consider other concurrent events. For example, one issue that has been looked at in more 
detail with respect to multi-unit PRAs is station blackout (SBO). SBO events are 
considered to have a high conditional core damage probability [6]. They are, however, 
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one of the most complicated events to analyze, even for a single unit, because of the 
interdependencies in the electrical systems [6]. Because of this complex nature, there is a 
high probability of underestimating the SBO frequency if the dependencies between 
multiple units are not modeled correctly [6]. For instance, the model developer must take 
into account that some systems, such as swing diesel generators, may be completely 
unavailable to one of the units during a simultaneous SBO or LOOP event [6].   
Another area that has been looked at by the industry with respect to multi-unit PRAs is 
seismic events [1]. One methodology looked at correlations between sister units and 
component fragility across the site; however, severe accident damage that could interfere 
with emergency operation of other undamaged units was not addressed [1]. Another 
study found that having crossties for emergency diesel generators (EDGs) during seismic 
events lowered the core damage frequency (CDF) of a single unit, the CDF of a two-unit 
site, and the frequency of nearly simultaneous core damage [18]. This study did not, 
however, evaluate the other dependencies that may exist on a two-unit site. Although 
some issues of multi-unit risk have been looked at in greater detail, no integrated 
approach exists and key limiting assumptions have still been made, such as the 
assumption of a single dependency, such as the aforementioned seismic events, between 
the units.  
The Seabrook Multi-Unit PRA is one of the only multi-unit PRAs existing to date and 
was created in 1983 [19]. First, initiating events were classified into three categories: 
those that will always affect multiple units, those that will sometimes affect multiple 
units, and those that are independent. From those initiating events that affected multiple 
units, dominant initiating events were chosen for quantification. These events included 
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LOOP, a truck crash into transmission lines, earthquakes, and flood of service water 
pumps. Next, a plant model was developed for the two-unit station and accident 
sequences frequencies were estimated. This plant model accounted for the occurrence of 
zero, one, or two accidents in a given year, the possibility of concurrent accidents, and 
potential for common cause failures. Common cause failures in the Seabrook PRA 
included design errors, human errors, plant mismanagement, and environmental stresses. 
The accident sequences were quantified by using explicit and parametric models. The 
parametric model that was used was the beta factor, and the beta factor was 
“subjectively” estimated. Finally, the frequency of events that affected both units was 
calculated as: 
 CDFT = 2CDFI - CDFC  Eq. 1.1.1  
where CDFT is the total site CDF, CDFI is the CDF of a single unit, irrespective of the 
other unit onsite, and CDFC is the frequency of a core damage event on both units 
concurrently. There was also some work done beyond a Level 1 PRA, and it was found 
that single reactor events had the greatest contribution to releases, despite the fact that 
concurrent accidents had the highest amount of release per event [19]. 
1.2 Analysis Options 
There are two basic ways to create a multi-unit PRA. One method is to develop an 
entirely new multi-unit PRA, and the other is to integrate existing single-unit PRAs. The 
possible prohibitive cost of developing a PRA and the potential technical impediments of 
creating a state-of-practice multi-unit PRA make the latter method more feasible 
practically and potentially economically because of the ability to utilize existing data and 
models. There has been at least one attempt to construct a comprehensive methodology 
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that would create a simplified multi-unit PRA by integrating multiple single-unit PRAs 
into a multi-unit PRA [4]. It consists of the following seven basic steps:  
1. Find the dominant sequences for the “baseline” plant. The baseline plant is 
simply the plant that will act as the anchor point for this process. 
2. Modify the initiating event frequencies and basic event failure probabilities of 
the baseline plant to account for another plant.  
3. Modify the initiating event frequencies and basic event failure probabilities of 
the subsequent plant to account for the baseline plant.  
4. Develop a multi-unit PRA using only the dominant sequences identified in 
Step 1.  
5. Create a Level 2 PRA for these plants.  
6. Create a Level 3 PRA for these plants.  
7. Repeat the process for each additional plant [4].  
This methodology requires the user to define many of the intermediate steps and create a 
Level 3 PRA for each unit at the site; additionally, it does not give prescriptive guidelines 
on how the initiating event frequencies and basic event probabilities should be adjusted to 
account for other units onsite. Since this method requires the analysis of each accident 
sequence, it is much more resource intensive than simply analyzing classes of accident 
sequences which, under the proposed classification schema in this thesis, can be 
accomplished. 
Since there are approximately one hundred systems in a nuclear power plant, there are 
many ways in which two or more units can be connected [20]. In order to truly address a 
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multi-unit PRA, one first must be able to understand all of the avenues in which units 
could be coupled. The multi-unit methodology proposed here defines a unit as a reactor 
core and its front-line and support systems, structures, and components (SSCs). That is, a 
unit at a traditional nuclear power plant would be everything inside of the primary 
containment building and power generation and supporting systems, and for small 
modular plants, a unit would be considered one module.  
1.3 Motivation 
The motivation for this thesis was the lack of formalized guidance for creating a multi-
unit PRA, which reflects the risk of circumstances that may affect multiple reactors at 
one site. Additionally, with small, modular reactors, where the plants are designed to 
have many inter-connected units, preparing for licensing, the NRC will be forced to 
address this issue.  
The events at Fukushima Daiichi also showed how important multi-unit events can be. 
On March 11, 2011, the largest earthquake Japan has ever experienced caused damage to 
six units’ system at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Forty-one minutes 
later, the first of seven tsunamis hit the site. Even more damage to all three units 
occurred, including the loss of the shared intake. Three of the six units had been 
operating at the time of the earthquake, and these units subsequently lost all cooling to 
their reactor cores. Despite the restoration of partial cooling, there was still hydrogen 
accumulation on these three units. Two units experienced a hydrogen explosion, and one 
also leaked hydrogen into an adjacent building causing a third unit to have a hydrogen 
explosion. This shows just a few of the potential interactions that can occur at a multi-
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unit nuclear power plant [21]. The risk community must determine the best way to 
address multi-unit site risk.  
1.4 Objectives 
 
The classification proposed in this thesis will attempt to explore the wide breadth of 
potential dependencies that occur at multi-unit sites and will allow multiple, independent, 
single-unit PRAs to be integrated into a single multi-unit PRA. This, in turn, will allow 
the site CDF to be evaluated. In reality, CDF can be calculated relative to a unit, a site, an 
owner utility, a country, a class of reactor designs (e.g., Mark-I boiling water reactors), or 
many other grouping variables. Dependencies do exist in each group and are different 
from one another. This paper, however, will focus only on the site CDF. A discussion on 
the definition of this site CDF can be found in Section 1.5. To calculate this site CDF, 
one can utilize existing single-unit PRAs and combine them using the proposed event 
classification and methodologies discussed in this thesis. These classifications and 
methodologies will allow multi-unit accidents to be considered in a comprehensive 
manner. This approach should be successful whether the multiple units are nearly 
identical or unique, as is the case when more than one reactor design or vintage exists at a 
site. The only difference between these will be the amount of sequences that are placed 
into each classification. 
1.5 Definition of Site CDF 
Defining the site CDF is not an arbitrary process and is not simply the addition of each 
unit’s marginal CDF because, as discussed, each unit does not operate fully segregated 
from other units onsite. Dependencies between most all units exist because they are 
beneficial from a safety, economic, or engineering perspective. In order to quantify a 
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multi-unit PRA, a new metric must be defined. In this thesis, the site CDF is used as this 
metric. Before site CDF can be defined, however, core damage needs to be defined. The 
use of the term “core damage” is somewhat subjective. The IAEA states that core damage 
for a light water reactor is often defined as exceeding the design basis limit of any of the 
fuel parameters [22]. The NRC’s SPAR models, on the other hand, define core damage as 
uncovery of the reactor fuel [23]. Others have defined core damage as the uncovery and 
heatup of the fuel to the point where “severe” fuel damage is anticipated [24]. Still others 
state that the definition of core damage is consistent world-wide and defined as local fuel 
temperature above 2200 °F, which is the regulatory limit defined in 
10 CFR 50.46(b)(1) [25]. No matter which definition is chosen, it must be kept consistent 
throughout the PRA. That is, when the single-unit PRAs are combined into the multi-unit 
PRA, the definition of core damage cannot change. The definition of core damage 
frequency as used in the single-unit PRA, however, must change as the single-unit PRAs 
are integrated into one multi-unit PRA. 
There are three different ways that the CDF for a multi-unit can be calculated. The 
traditional method is to look at the frequency of core damage per unit, per year 
irrespective of the operating states of other units. Another is to examine the frequency of 
one unit having core damage while assuming the other units do not experience core 
damage (i.e., exactly one core damage). The final approach is to look at the frequency of 
multiple concurrent core damages. 
This lends itself to two ways by which the site CDF can be calculated. The first is by 
calculating the frequency of exactly one core damage event occurring per site per year. 
That is, the frequency of one unit having a core damage event during a year, while the 
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other units do not. The other is to calculate the frequency of multiple core damages 
occurring nearly simultaneously per site per year. That is, the frequency of one unit 
experiencing a core damage event during a year, while another unit is also experiencing a 
core damage event. All combinations of these cases lead to the definition of site CDF, 
which is at least one core damage per site per year. The CDF for exactly one core 
damage event occurring per site year would be, for example, the frequency of unit 1 only 
experiencing a core damage event or only unit 2 experiencing a core damage event; this 
would be either the dark or light section in Figure 1, respectively. Whereas, the frequency 
of multiple core damage events would be the intersection area of Figure 1. The sum of 
the areas would represent at least one core damage event. 
  
Figure 1: Venn Diagram of Core Damage Frequency 
Both calculations can be useful for a nuclear power plant operator to know. Calculating 
the frequency of exactly one core damage would allow the nuclear power plant to 
compare to the NRC safety goal for CDF [26]. Additionally, this type of calculation 
could be used for importance calculations and risk-informed modifications such as in the 
technical specifications and for components in the reliability assurance program. If the 
plant, however, wanted to be able to expand the Level 1 PRA to a Level 2 or 3 PRA, then 
knowing the probability of nearly simultaneous core damage, which would maximize the 
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potential release, would be more beneficial. This allows the plant to understand SSCs that 
are important to severe accident progression as well as evaluate options for emergency 
planning. If expanded to a Level 2 PRA, this calculation would also allow the plant to 
compare their site large early release frequency (LERF) to the NRC safety goal for LERF 
[26] or simply large release frequency for new reactors [27]. As previously mentioned, 
this concept can also be extended to estimate CDF with respect to a plant owner, a 
vendor, or any other organizational commonality.   
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Chapter 2 Classifications 
2.1 Introduction 
To gain an accurate view of a multi-unit site’s risk profile, the CDF for the site rather 
than the unit should be considered. There are many types of events that could create a 
dependency between multiple units from a risk perspective. In order to effectively 
account for these risks when looking to create a multi-unit PRA, six main commonality 
classifications have been established: initiating events, shared connections, identical 
components, proximity dependencies, human dependencies, and organizational 
dependencies. An illustration of these classes can be seen in Figure 2. Additionally, there 
is a seventh class, independent events, which does not affect multiple units. Since this 
thesis is focused on the mulit-unit dependencies, the discussion of the seventh class will 
be limited.  
 
Figure 2: Commonality Classification of Events 
The first step in the proposed process is to sort the events in the single-unit accident 
sequences into the seven classifications, which are introduced briefly here, but explored 
in greater detail in the following sections. The first classification, initiating events, refers 
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to single events that have the capacity to affect multiple units of a nuclear power plant 
site. The initiating event class is divided into two subclasses: definite and conditional. 
The second classification, shared connections, refers to links (piping, cables, power 
divisions, etc.) between components that physically connect multiple units. The shared 
connection class is divided into three subclasses: single SSC, time sequential, and 
standby sharing. The third classification, identical components, represents components 
that are the same design for multiple units. This class is considered in single-unit PRAs 
under “common cause” failures among SSCs. The fourth classification, proximity 
dependencies, occurs when one or more environments are shared among multiple units’ 
SSCs and have the ability to adversely affect their operation. The fifth class, human 
dependencies, refers to commonalities that may be created from a person’s interaction 
with an SSC. The human dependency class is divided into two subclasses: pre-initiating 
event and post-initiating event. The sixth class, organizational dependencies, occurs when 
an organization connects multiple units (through programs such as operating and 
emergency procedures, reliability assurance, surveillance procedures, training, 
simulators, etc.), typically through either a logical error or a permeating culture. 
Additionally, there is a seventh category of events, SSCs, and human actions that are 
completely independent. Once the sequences have been sorted, each classification can be 
considered. This allows the data set to be reduced from one hundred systems, as 
previously mentioned, to just seven classifications that need to be analyzed. A discussion 
of each classification is provided in the next section. It should be noted that in the 
proposed form, this classification schema is not mutually exclusive. Specific coupling 
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factors, such as manufacturing attributes or component internal parts, could be assigned 
to each class, in order for the proposed classification to be made more exclusive [28].  
2.2 Initiating Events 
The first class, initiating events, represents those single events that have the capacity to 
affect multiple units of a nuclear power plant site. Not all initiating events that are 
incorporated into a typical nuclear power plant PRA will affect more than one unit on a 
site, although several have that capability. These initiating events can be divided into two 
subclasses, events that will always affect multiple units, referred to as “definite” events, 
and events that will only affect multiple units under certain circumstances, referred to as 
“conditional” events [19]. These subclasses are illustrated in Table 1. The initiating 
events used in Table 1 are taken from NUREG/CR-6928 and IAEA-TECDOC-1341 [29, 
30]. 
Table 1: Examples of Initiating Event Subclasses 
Definite Conditional 
Loss of Offsite Power Loss of Emergency Service 
Water 
Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink Loss of Condenser Vacuum 
Station Blackout Loss of Component Cooling 
Water 
 Loss of Feedwater 
 Loss of DC Bus 
 Loss of Instrument Air 
 Steam Generator Tube 
Rupture 
Those events that will always affect multiple units include loss of offsite power and loss 
of the ultimate heat sink Those events that have the potential to affect multiple units 
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under certain circumstances include loss of service water, and loss of condenser vacuum. 
Examples of circumstances that may cause the conditional initiating events are loss of 
cooling water intake, which may be associated with certain loss of coolant vacuum or 
loss of service water events, or different turbine missile trajectories, which would change 
the affect they have on one or multiple units. It should be noted that depending on the site 
and reactor design, these subclasses may include different initiating events from those 
listed in Table 1. For example, if there are no connections in the instrument air system, 
then events involving instrument air would be classified as independent, rather than a 
conditional initiating event as seen in Table 1. 
2.3 Shared Connections 
The second class, shared connections, refers to links that physically connect SSCs of 
multiple units. These connections may be in three different sub-classes [31, 20]. The first 
subclass is a single SSC. This occurs when multiple units rely on a single SSC for 
simultaneous support. Two examples are using the same plant exhaust stack or having a 
common header for safety injection. The second subclass is time sequential sharing or 
cross-connected SSCs. This is when an SSC is able to fully support any single unit; 
however, it is not capable of simultaneously supporting multiple units. This often occurs 
between electrical power supplies at nuclear power plants. The third subclass is standby 
sharing. Standby sharing occurs when multiple units share a standby or spare SSC that 
can only be used to support a single unit. This approach is commonly seen for safety 
systems such as emergency diesel generators and fire water systems. A more 
comprehensive list of systems that may be shared can be found in Table 2 [20].  
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Table 2: Examples of Shared System Subclasses 
Single SSC Time Sequential Standby 
Plant Stack Startup Auxiliary Transformer Standby AC Power Systems, 
including diesel generators 
Intake Structure Diesel Generator Standby Pumps 
Control Room Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and 
Clean-Up System 
B.5.b Equipment: Portable 
components 
Diesel Generator Building Chemical and Volume Control 
System 
 
Refueling Floor* Vital 125V DC Control Power 
System 
 
Water Treatment Building Offsite Power System  
Fire Protection System Auxiliary Feedwater System  
Independent Fuel Storage 
Installation 
Boron Recovery System**  
Makeup Water Treatment  
System 
Component Cooling Water  
Potable and Sanitary Water 
System 
Service Water  
Plant Communication System Compressed Air  
Reactor Building Crane Recirculating Cooling Water  
Auxiliary Building Residual Heat Removal  
Turbine Building Condenser Circulating Water  
Emergency Gas Treatment 
System 
  
Auxiliary Steam System**   
Ultimate Heat Sink   




Switchyard   
 
* Denotes systems specific to boiling water reactors 
**Denotes systems specific to pressurized water reactors 
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2.4 Identical Components 
The third class, identical components, represents components that have the same design, 
operation, and operating environment for multiple units. This means that the components 
are designed, installed, and maintained nearly identically and are operated in the same 
manner making them susceptible to traditional common-cause failures that are considered 
for single units. This not only includes conventional components, but also digital 
instrumentation and control systems and software.  
2.5 Proximity Dependencies 
The fourth class, proximity dependencies, can be manifested in several different ways. 
Proximity dependencies occur when a single environment has the potential to affect 
multiple units. This common environment could be either intentionally or unintentionally 
created. The proximity could be within a room, positions between or within systems, or 
occur because of the site layout. Additionally, conduits and doors may connect otherwise 
independent areas. If, for example, certain components of the chemical and volume 
control system for multiple units were in the same room, a fire or other event could affect 
multiple units. Likewise, if there was an explosion onsite and two units were located very 
close together, the same explosion could affect both units.  
2.6 Human Dependencies 
The fifth class, human dependencies, can also be manifested in a variety of ways. Human 
dependencies occur when a person’s interaction with a machine affects multiple units. 
This could be an operator, a maintenance team member, a member of an installation 
crew, or the like. Human dependencies are split into two subclasses, pre-initiating event 
and post-initiating event actions. Table 3 illustrates some of these potential dependencies.  
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Table 3: Examples of Human Dependency Subclasses 
Pre-Initiating Event Post-Initiating Event 
Missing surveillances Misalignment of breakers after LOOP or SBO 
Maintenance cleaning Misalignment of valves after transient 
Identical installations Mental slip because of lack of attention to other 
units after an event 
Transposition errors  
Identical maintenance actions  
Human actions that occur before an event typically create latent conditions. For instance, 
in currently operating plants the same maintenance team could perform the same task and 
create the same failure environment on multiple units. Human actions that occur after an 
event typically have immediate consequences. One example would be in small modular 
reactors where the same operator controls multiple plants at once. As he is responding to 
a situation on one unit, he may not notice or be able to control an evolving situation on 
another unit.  
2.7 Organizational Dependencies 
The sixth class, organizational dependencies, has a number of different facets. 
Organizational dependencies occur when an organization somehow connects multiple 
units, typically by some sort of logic error or culture that permeates the organization. 
Although human and organizational dependencies are closely related, there is delineation 
between the two, which lies in the root cause of the failure. Human dependencies are 
dependencies that are caused by the man-machine interaction, while organizational 
dependencies are often human actions caused by the logic or culture of the organization. 
In this case, the organization could refer to a department at the plant, the plant itself, or 
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the vendor that supplies components to the plant. These dependencies occur because the 
same logic or culture exists across an entire group, which affects multiple units and, at 
times, multiple sites. Examples of these dependencies can be seen in Table 4.  
Table 4: Examples of Organizational Dependencies 
Incorrect procedure that has been mirrored for multiple units 
Latent design issue that affects multiple units 
Incorrect calculation that is used on multiple units 
Incorrect technical specifications that have been mirrored for multiple units 
Incorrect vendor guidance that has been applied to multiple units.  
Incorrect engineering judgment that has been applied to multiple units 
A misinterpretation of guidance or requirements that affects multiple units 
A misunderstanding of system configuration or function that affects multiple units 
Poor safety culture, which leads to errors of judgment and execution across the 
organization 
Lack of adequate training and skills for events that affect multiple units 
 
Examples of organizational dependencies would be if the engineering department makes 
the same incorrect assumption on calculations for multiple units or if equivalent 
procedures are used between two units. Another could be only having one fire brigade for 
the entire site. Furthermore, organizational dependencies could exist if the same vendor 
provides equipment and guidance for multiple units. Using the same guidance from a 
vendor on multiple units could create a dependency across units, for example.  
2.8 Independent Events 
The seventh class, independent events, represents those events that do not create a 
dependency between multiple units. This class only includes events whose occurrence 
and effect are limited to a single unit. Any events or SSCs that do not fall into the 
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previously discussed categories would fall into this classification. For example, a loss of 
coolant accident would be an independent event. Additionally, the majority of the SSCs 
for each unit would be in this category.  
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Chapter 3 Analysis of Past Multi-Unit Events 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to verify that the proposed classification encompasses all potential events that 
may link multiple units, Licensee Event Reports (LERs) that were submitted to the NRC 
were analyzed. Events that affected multiple units were classified into each of the classes 
and subclasses. The LERs were also examined to see if there was an official NRC finding 
from the event. NRC findings were analyzed because they evaluate the risk significance 
of the event. Also in the course of the analysis, dependencies beyond the site, such as 
dependencies caused by vendor guidance, were noted.  
3.2 Licensee Event Reports 
To confirm that the created classification includes all potential events that may link 
multiple units, all LERs that were submitted to the NRC from 2000 through 2011 were 
evaluated. LERs are submitted to the NRC after plant abnormalities in accordance with 
guidelines prescribed in 10 CFR 50.73. These LERs discuss the apparent root causes of 
the events and actions that will be taken by the licensee. It should be noted that LERs 
include both existing conditions (i.e., latent conditions) that have been found, that is 
conditions that were discovered before becoming events, and events that have occurred at 
the plant, that is conditions that were not caught before causing an event. Three-hundred-
ninety-one of 4207 total LERs affected multiple units on a site, which amounts to 9% of 
all LERs submitted between 2000 and 2011. This represents a significant number of 
multi-unit issues that happen every year; however, 91% of the events belonged to the 
seventh event classification, independent events. Each multi-unit LER was reviewed 
individually to determine the cause of the dependency between the units. It should be 
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noted that the dependency was not always the root cause of the plant abnormality. For 
example, in some instances a maintenance member did not follow procedure while 
working on a common system. The dependency link in these cases was not the human 
error, but rather the fact that the system was common to multiple units. The most 
common link between multiple units was organizational dependencies. These included 
everything from symmetrical procedures and technical specifications across units to 
vendor and departmental logic errors. This accounted for 41% of the 391 multi-unit 
LERs. Single shared SSCs were the next most common link and accounted for 28% of 
the multi-unit LERs. Table 5 outlines further the breakdown of classifications. 
Additionally, it should be noted that while the majority of LERs only affected two units, 
twenty-nine LERs (7% of the multi-unit LERs) affected three units. Appendix 1 has a full 
listing of all the LERs that were analyzed with the classification and subclass assigned.   
Table 5: Multi-Unit Licensee Event Report Classifications from 2000-2011 
Classification Percentage of Total Example LER 
Initiating Event 6.91%  
Definite 3.84% Severe weather 
caused a LOOP event 
that resulted in the 
automatic scram of 
three units [32]. 
Conditional 3.07% Divers working on 
Unit 2 piping became 
unresponsive, so Unit 
1 was tripped due to 
concern for diver 
safety [33]. 
Shared Connection 34.27%  
Single 27.62% Two units had to be 
shut down because of 
macro fouling in the 
shared intake [34].  
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Time Sequential 5.88% An auxiliary 
feedwater (AFW) 
pump was found to be 
inoperable. The AFW 
system is shared 
between two units. 
One dedicated train 
for each unit and a 
swing train [35].  
Standby 0.77% The standby EDG 
was aligned during 
testing. The operators 
did not recognize this 
system alignment, and 
did not correctly start 
emergency service 
water pumps to 
prevent auto start 
during the testing 
[36]. 
Identical component 10.49% Neutron flux monitor 
channels were spliced 
incorrectly on two 
units [37].  
Proximity 4.60% It was identified that 
fire damage in the 
cable spreading room 
may prevent the 
ability to safely 
shutdown two units 
[38].  
Human 3.07%  




system igniter glow 
coils on two units 
[39].  
Page | 23  
 
Post-Initiating event 0.26% After an electrical 
transient, the 
operators did not 
correctly close 
breakers, which 
resulted in a condition 
in which two out of 
four emergency buses 
per unit would not 
have automatically 
received power from 
their respective EDGs 
in the event of a 
LOOP [40]. 
Organizational 40.66% A calculation for 
high-energy line 
breaks that was used 
for multiple units was 
found to have errors 
[41].  
3.3 NRC Findings 
Under the NRC’s Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), inspection findings are evaluated 
under the Significance Determination Process (SDP) and assigned a color that indicates 
its safety significance [42]. Findings with very low safety significance are labeled 
“green.” “White” findings have low to moderate safety significance, “yellow” findings 
have substantial safety significance, and “red” findings have high safety significance. For 
violations that are not subject to the SDP, a severity level is assigned in accordance with 
the NRC Enforcement Policy [43]. Violations with very low safety significance are 
“Severity Level IV.” “Severity Level III” violations have moderate safety significance, 
“Severity Level II” violations have significant safety significance, and “Severity Level I” 
have serious safety significance. Of the 391 LERs determined as multi-unit events, the 
NRC cited eight as official findings (two red, one yellow, two white, two green, and one 
Severity Level III violation), which equates to two percent of the multi-unit LERs. Four 
findings were linked to organizational factors, two to shared SSCs, one to identical 
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equipment, and one to human action. Table 6 maps the finding to the appropriate LER 
and event classification.  






Description of Event Finding 
259/2009-003 Shared system;  single SSC 
The shared standby gas treatment (SGT) system 
relay failed, causing the SGT system to be 
inoperable for all three units onsite [44].  
Green 
266/2002-005 Shared system; time sequential 
The flow restricting orifices on the shared AFW 
system pumps were found to have the potential 
to be simultaneously clogged. The AFW system 






Two consecutive maintenance mechanics filled a 
dry shielded canister with argon gas, rather than 
helium gas. This event could have had adverse 




Inadequate safe shutdown instructions had the 
potential to render the residual heat removal 
pumps inoperable on two units during a fire 
event [47].  
Green 
266/2001-005 Organizational 
An error in the emergency operating procedures 
resulted in the potential to intensify an accident 
that had loss of instrument air on two units [48].  
Red 
269/2002-001 Organizational 
An incorrect calculation resulted in the inability 
to adequately control the pressurizer heater from 
the Standby Shutdown Facility on three units, 
which could result in the loss of pressure control 
during events when the Standby Shutdown 
Facility is needed [49].  
White 
528/2004-009 Organizational 
Procedures did not contain necessary 
requirements for Emergency Core Cooling 
System (ECCS) piping voids for three units. The 
voids that were created could have caused the 
ECCS to be inoperable during a loss of coolant 
accident [50]. 
Yellow 
250/2005-004 Identical Equipment 
The same fuse type was installed on two units’ 
emergency containment filter (ECF) fan. After 
two back-to-back blown fuses, the licensee 
identified that the fuse design was not 
acceptable. The ECF is designed to remove 
radioactive iodine in the case of an accident [51]. 
White 
Not only were dependencies found between multiple units on a single site, but there were 
also several instances that affected more than one site. There were two occurrences of 
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Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letters that caused multiple sites to reach the 
threshold of submitting an LER, one in 2002 [52, 53, 54, 55] and again in 2009 [56, 57, 
58, 59]. The Westinghouse letter in 2002 alerted sites that the steam generator low-low 
level setpoint for a reactor trip was potentially non-conservative, while the 2005 letter 
warned sites that in Modes 3 and 4 there could be vapor in the ECCS during a loss of 
coolant accident. Additionally, two sister plants, located in different sites, had two 
separate instances of events that affected both plant sites. The first event in 2005 occurred 
while local leak rate tests were performed during core alterations or movement of 
irradiated fuel within containment were in progress, thereby creating direct access from 
the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere [60]. This condition had existed 
on both sites, each with two units. The second, which occurred in 2010, could have 
caused the loss of the component cooling system safety function at both sites [61].  
This analysis shows that not only do multi-unit precursor events occur, but also they can 
have significant consequences. Evaluation of LERs over an eleven-year period shows that 
almost ten percent of events that occur at nuclear power plant sites affect multiple units. 
Furthermore, using NRC findings as an indicator, eight of those events (2%) had safety 
significance. Additionally, the aforementioned classification accurately captured all the 
possible events as evident in the LERs and was found to be complete.   
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Chapter 4 Methodologies 
4.1 Introduction 
Four different methodologies have been identified that can be used to quantify the six 
classes of unit-to-unit dependencies. These methodologies are combination, parametric, 
causal-based, and extension methodologies. In some cases, the implementation of the 
methodology will vary depending on whether exactly one core damage or nearly 
simultaneous core damage is being calculated. The details of the differences of these two 
CDF definitions can be found in Section 1.5. Nonetheless, the basic logic will be the 
same no matter which probability is being calculated. In cases where the more detailed 
logic is appreciably different, the implementation of these two separate calculations will 
be discussed. The combination method simply requires combining existing single-unit 
PRAs into a multi-unit PRA. The parametric methods rely on a parameter, or several 
parameters, that are related to a conditional probability for all units. The causal-based 
method would require that all events be mapped back to a root problem, whether it is a 
physical failure or an organizational deficiency. The extension method would only 
require some existing portions of the PRA to be developed further. There is also a special 
case of the extension method, which uses existing methodologies for external events and 
applies them to a broader subset of events. For calculations in this thesis, CDF1 and CDF2 
will represent the single unit CDFs from the existing single-unit PRA of a two-unit site, 
which have been previously calculated irrespective of the failures or events on other 
units. 
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4.2 Combination 
For some classes and subclasses, the only thing that needs to be done to create a multi-
unit PRA is to combine the existing single-unit PRAs. The items (SSCs, initiating events, 
etc.) that are already common to multiple plants will always be common; they simply 
need to be represented as one item in the multi-unit PRA so that they are not double 
counted in the quantification of the site CDF, LERF, etc. For these items, there will be no 
effect on the site CDF (i.e., the site CDF is the CDF of one unit multiplied by the number 
of units on the site); however, the importance of the items may increase in the final risk 
importance measures. For example, if the following cutsets were obtained for each unit of 
a two-unit site where b was a shared component between the units and Ii represents the 
initiating events:  




and the CDF of each unit was as follows:  
 QCDF1 =I1 abc+ I2 def+ I3 gbh Eq. 4.2.1  
 QCDF2 = I4 zby+ I5 xwv+ I6 ubt Eq. 4.2.2  
where QCDF is the quantification of the CDF. For the remainder of this thesis, when CDF 
is used in an equation, it will imply Boolean logic. Then the site CDF of exactly one core 
damage could be calculated as:  
 CDFCDFCDFCDFCDF 2121T •+•=  Eq. 4.2.3  
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This can be treated as:  
 CDFT=CDF1+CDF2 Eq. 4.2.4  
by using house events during the model development. House events “switch” between 
true and false to account for conditional success of the other unit. Alternatively, the 
equation above can be used by combining the marginal CDFs, and using the complement 
events. In this approach, a modern PRA software tool, such as System Analysis Programs 
for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) or Computer-Aided Fault 
Tree Analysis (CAFTA), would need to be used. The use of a house event will be 
assumed for the remainder of this thesis.  
The CDF of exactly one unit can now be represented as: 
 QCDFT = I2 def+ I5 xwv+ (I1 abc+ I3 gbh+ I4 zby+ I6 ubt) Eq. 4.2.5  
 QCDFT =A+B Eq. 4.2.6  
where  
 A= I2 def+ I5 xwv Eq. 4.2.7  
 B= I1 abc+ I3 gbh+ I4 zby+ I6 ubt Eq. 4.2.8  
and A represents cutsets that do not contain the shared component and B represents 
cutsets with the shared component (i.e., component b in this example).  
4.3 Parametric 
Another methodology that may be used for certain classes of dependencies is parametric 
methods. Parametric methods are commonly used in traditional single-unit PRAs for 
common cause failure events. These methods include the alpha or beta factor and 
multiple Greek letter (MGL) models. The parameters that are created using these 
methods are used to quantify conditional probabilities of events. For parametric 
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modeling, the details of the logic will be slightly different for calculating the probability 
of exactly one core damage and the probability of nearly simultaneous core damage. 
If the probability of exactly one core damage is being calculated, then the CDF of a two-
unit site can be represented as:  
 CDF1= A1+B1 Eq. 4.3.1  
 CDF2= A2+B2 Eq. 4.3.2  
 
where A represents cutsets that do not contain the affected components and B represents 
cutsets with affected components. Then, the CDF for exactly one core damage could be 
represented as:  
 CDFT= CDF1+ CDF2 Eq. 4.3.3  
 CDFT= A1+ A2 + ρ B1+B2 Eq. 4.3.4  
 CDFT = A1+B1+ A2+B2 Eq. 4.3.5  
where ρ is a dimensionless parameter multiplier that accounts for the increased 
probability of B1 and B2 occurring together because of the dependency. 
If, however, the probability of nearly simultaneous core damage was being calculated, 
then the site CDF would be represented as: 
 CDFT = (A1+B1) • (A2+B2) Eq. 4.3.6  
 QCDFT = I1Pr(A1) I3Pr(A2)+ I1Pr(A1)I4Pr(B2)+I2Pr(B1) I3Pr(A2)+ 
I3Pr(B1) I4Pr(B2) 
Eq. 4.3.7  
where I represents the initiating events and where 
 Pr(Bi) = Pr(Bi│C) Pr(C)+Pr(Bi│  Pr(  Eq. 4.3.8  
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where C is the root event that causes dependence (coupling factor). Assuming the 
conditional probability when C does not happen is approximately the same as the non-
conditional probability of failure by the rare event approximation yields, 
 Pr(Bi) = Pr(Bi│C) Pr(C)+Pr(Bi) (1-Pr(C)) Eq. 4.3.9  
then substituting Equation 4.3.9 into Equation 4.3.7 yields,  
 
QCDFT = I1Pr(A1) I3Pr(A2)+ I1Pr(A1)I4[Pr(B2│C) Pr(C)+Pr(B2) 
(1-Pr(C))]+ I3Pr(A2)I2[Pr(B1│C) Pr(C)+Pr(B1) (1-Pr(C))] + 
I2[Pr(B1│C) Pr(C)+Pr(B1) (1-Pr(C))] I4[Pr(B2│C) Pr(C)+Pr(B2) 
(1-Pr(C))] 
Eq. 4.3.10  
and factoring out Pr(C) yields,  
 
QCDFT = I1Pr(A1) I3Pr(A2)+ I1Pr(A1)I4[Pr(B2) + 
Pr(C)(Pr(B2│C)-Pr(B2))]+ I3Pr(A2)I2[Pr(B1) + Pr(C)(Pr(B1│C)-
Pr(B1))] + I2[Pr(B1) + Pr(C)(Pr(B1│C)-Pr(B1))] I4[Pr(B2) + 
Pr(C)(Pr(B2│C)-Pr(B2))] 
Eq. 4.3.11  
and incorporating the parameter ρ yields, 
 
QCDFT = I1Pr(A1) I3Pr(A2)+ I1Pr(A1)I4[(1-ρ)Pr(B2) + 
ρ(Pr(B2│C)-Pr(B2))]+I2[(1-ρ)Pr(B1) + ρ(Pr(B1│C)-Pr(B1))] 
I3Pr(A2)+ I2[(1-ρ)Pr(B1) + ρ(Pr(B1│C)-Pr(B1))] I4[(1-ρ)Pr(B2) + 
ρ(Pr(B2│C)-Pr(B2))] Eq. 4.3.12  
where ρ is a constant and the defined parameter that represents the probability of 
condition C existing. 
In order to estimate the aforementioned parameters, a number of different parametric 
models could be used. Parametric models can be divided into two major categories: shock 
models and nonshock models [62]. While nonshock models look at basic event 
probabilities for random independent causes of single component failures, shock models 
also consider common cause “shocks” that impact the system at a certain frequency. The 
only shock model that has been used in nuclear power plant PRAs is the binomial failure 
rate (BFR) model [62]. Due to its complexity, however, it is not widely used. 
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The alpha factor, beta factor, and MGL models are nonshock methods and are currently 
used in nuclear power plant PRAs [62]. Within nonshock models there are two 
categories, identified as single parameter and multiple parameters models. The beta factor 
is a single parameter model. The alpha factor and MGL models are multiple parameter 
models, which means that they introduce more than one parameter to help calculate the 
conditional probabilities. This allows for partial dependencies between more than two 
components. The parameters in the MGL model have no direct relation to observable 
data, whereas the alpha factor model parameters, on the other hand, are estimated from 
observable data [62]. Currently nuclear power plants rely almost completely on the alpha 
and MGL models to model common cause failures because they strike a balance between 
complexity and accuracy. 
The Seabrook Multi-Unit PRA used the beta factor [19]; however, there is not much 
information on how parameters currently used in single-unit PRAs would translate to 
multi-unit PRAs. Use of the beta factor in a multi-unit PRA may be problematic, given 
the conservatism that occurs when the common cause failure group is higher than four 
[62]. The other current parametric models may not adequately address multi-unit PRAs 
because they use parameter estimators that assume that when one train of a system is 
challenged, all similar trains are also challenged [62]. This is oftentimes not the case for 
multi-unit events. For example, during a single-unit reactor trip, the supporting systems 
for that unit will be called upon while other units’ systems usually continue with normal 
operation. New parametric methods may need to be developed to accurately capture the 
conditional probabilities present in multi-unit PRAs.    
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4.4 Causal-based 
Another methodology that may be used to model certain classifications is causal-based 
modeling. Causal-based modeling is simply another method to solve for the probability 
of the dependence existing (or Pr(C) in Equations 4.3.8-12). This type of modeling may 
take many forms such as process modeling techniques, regression-based techniques, 
deterministic dynamic techniques, or Bayesian belief networks [63]. Depending on which 
causal model is used, there may be no need to differentiate between the probability of 
exactly one core damage and nearly simultaneous core damage events.  
There are many different types of dynamic deterministic methods. Two forms are 
dynamic event trees and dynamic fault trees. Dynamic event trees and fault trees were 
developed to utilize the advantages of state-space models, which are models that are not 
systemically oriented, while keeping the representation of the static trees by using 
dynamic gates to establish interaction among components and modify their failure 
attitude [64]. When using dynamic event trees and fault trees, the fault trees are 
developed first, followed by the dynamic event trees [65]. An example of these dynamic 
gates can be seen in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Dynamic AND Gate [65] 
Dynamic event trees and fault trees are susceptible to extremely large numbers of 
algorithms because the resolution cannot be performed with Boolean algebra [64]. 
Dynamic event trees are similar to conventional event trees, except the branching times 
are determined from a system simulator through user-defined branching rules and 
associated probabilities. Branching rules can be used to model the uncertainty in the 
hardware/human/process behavior [65]. For example, if the system requires a valve to 
open when the pressure is above a preset limit, a branching rule could be created that the 
valve either opens or fails when the system pressure, as determined by the system 
simulator, reaches the predefined set point. This branching ensures relevant possibilities 
are captured for different scenarios [65]. Dynamic fault trees account for the timing of 
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failure events by using deductive logic to identify event sequences leading to a specified 
top event [65].  
Dynamic master logic diagrams (DMLDs) are another form of dynamic deterministic 
methods that can be used to model failures or the potential for failures in real time. A 
DMLD can combine physical relationships, Boolean relationships, and fuzzy logic1
Figure 4
 into 
a single diagram [66].  shows a simple diagram of a DMLD that represents the 
amount of components that can be powered from three sets of batteries. In Figure 4, the 
Pr(C) would be the output of the “Number of Components that Can be Powered” box. 
 
Figure 4: Dynamic Master Logic Diagram 
Another causal model, a binary decision diagram (BDD), consists of nodes, which have 
exactly two output nodes (either 0 or 1). These nodes are then placed in a network to 
                                                 
 
1 Fuzzy logic: “a form of mathematical logic in which truth can assume a continuum of values between 0 and 1.” [90] 
A-H are fuzzy modes 
of battery status 
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illustrate the relationships between the components. All of the nodes feed into two final 
states, either 0 or 1, that is operation or failure [67]. An example of a BDD can be seen in 
Figure 5. In Figure 5, Pr(C) would be the probability of A occurring. 
 
Figure 5: Binary Decision Diagram 
The Socio-Technical Risk Analysis (SoTeRiA) method uses a causal-based method to 
create an organizational safety risk framework that maps the organizational roots of risk 
[68]. This model would allow organizational failures to be mapped into existing PRAs. 
Mohaghegh has also developed a method that uses a causal-based method to integrate a 
Probabilistic Physics-of-Failure model into a traditional nuclear power plant PRA [69]. A 
physics-of-failure model allows underlying physical failure methods (e.g., wear, fatigue 
fracture, creep, etc.) to be incorporated into risk models [70]. Using physical models 
allows not only failures, but also potential failures to be observed. A physics-of-failure 
approach would likely need to be combined with some other sort of model, such as a 
DMLD or Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) in order to get the full value of such a model. 
Value would also be added, by using the approach with a traditional event tree, fault tree 
PRA. 
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The most established causal-based techniques are BBNs. They are also the most versatile, 
as they can be combined with any of the other causal based methodologies [63]. A BBN 
is a directed acyclic graph or influence diagram that models relationships of a set of 
variables, as seen in Figure 6 [71]. In Figure 6, Pr(C) would be both the probability of A 
and B occurring. 
 
Figure 6: Directed Acyclic Graph [72] 
The nodes of the graph (A through H) represent random variables, and the links represent 
relationships between these probabilistically determined variables [71]. BBNs also allow 
dissimilar information to be combined, such as qualitative information like that from 
expert panels, as well as quantitative data [73]. There are four basic steps to creating a 
BBN [74]:  
1. Define a decision node; that is, the main node 
2. Define the evidence nodes, which are those nodes that are related to the main 
node, whether indirectly or directly 
3. Define the relationship between the evidence nodes and the decision node 
4. Quantify each link 
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In open source literature, no examples of BBNs being used in nuclear power plant PRAs 
were found, but causal-based methods have been used in a variety of areas such as 
artificial intelligence [72]. Despite their low use, there are methods that have been 
developed to integrate causal-based methods into traditional nuclear power plant PRAs, 
such as the aforementioned SoTeRiA and physics-of-failure model. 
4.5 Extension of Current PRA 
Another methodology that could be used to quantify the event classifications is to merely 
extend the current breadth of the existing PRA. This approach would simply extend the 
traditional PRA model, which typically consists of a combination of event trees and fault 
trees. For the extension method, it would be necessary to determine at the outset whether 
nearly simultaneous core damage events were going to be calculated or if only the 
probability of exactly one core damage would be the focus. If the model only considers 
exactly one core damage, the extension method could be completed as described below; 
however, if nearly simultaneous core damage events were to be included, then the model 
developer would need to take special care to add in top events that include scenarios that 
lead to nearly simultaneous core damage. The first step in this process would be to 
identify initiating events that are not in the existing single-unit PRAs [75]. For example, 
some scenarios from one unit’s Level 2 PRA may actually create an initiating event for 
another unit’s Level 1 PRA. These new initiating events would have to be determined on 
a plant-by-plant basis. In many other cases, there may not be any new initiating events to 
identify. This would be true for the SSCs that are currently included in PRA models for 
nuclear power plants. Then, event trees would be developed for the new initiating events 
and extended for those initiating events that were in the single-unit PRAs [75]. For 
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example, for a LOOP initiating event, the top events may need to include failure of one 
unit’s EDGs, failure of another unit’s EDGs, and failure of both units’ EDGs, rather than 
simply having one top event for EDG failure. By adding these top events, the PRA is then 
further modified to account for multi-unit dependencies. If necessary, fault trees would 
then be developed for the new top events of the event trees. Also, if needed, basic event 
probabilities would be evaluated. Finally, the model would be quantified [75]. 
A special case of extension methodologies that could be employed is one that is similar to 
those that are currently used to model and quantify external events. There are several 
external event methodologies that are used for nuclear power plants, and, depending on 
which of these external event methodologies is chosen, in addition to any other 
methodologies used in conjunction with them, the necessity of differentiating between 
exactly one core damage and nearly simultaneous core damage events will vary. For the 
most part, since event trees and fault trees are created, the model developer will need to 
ensure the inclusion of top events that could lead to nearly simultaneous core damage, if 
that is the goal of the evaluation. 
The NRC’s methodology for external events includes an initial evaluation, then a 
screening or bounding analysis, followed by a qualitative and then quantitative analysis. 
If necessary, a detailed analysis can be performed on the remaining events [76]. The 
initial evaluation involves a site walk down to identify any areas that may be susceptible 
to dependencies. During external event evaluations, this evaluation typically focuses on a 
single category of external events (e.g., seismic events, fire, and floods) that could affect 
a unit. The screening analysis involves a qualitative look at what events could 
realistically occur. For typical external event evaluations, an event frequency of 1×10-07 
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per reactor year or lower is screened out from further evaluation [77, 78]. The qualitative 
analysis would then focus on the consequences of those events that have not been 
screened out. If the consequences were small, then those events could also be screened 
out. The events that remain would then be quantitatively analyzed to determine their 
effect on the site’s risk profile. If a more detailed analysis still needed to be completed for 
some events, such as a fire propagation model, then this analysis could be completed for 
those specific events.  
Another option would be the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) external 
event methodology, which has seven basic steps. The first two are to identify the external 
event and the postulated plant conditions. Then, scenarios and external event 
classifications are developed, followed by identification of design parameters and loading 
schemes. Next, safety SSCs are identified, and it is determined if their safety function is 
affected by the identified external events. If necessary, design modifications are made so 
that all safety-related SSCs are functional during external events [79].  
For both fire and seismic events, there are special means to create traditional event tree-
fault tree PRAs. These approaches could also be used for a multi-unit PRA. A two-part 
approach is typically used for a fire PRA. First, as with other external events, a screening 
analysis is done to identify important fire locations. In the second phase, those important 
fire locations are analyzed, usually with the combination of a traditional event tree-fault 
tree approach and more detailed fire propagation, damage, and suppression models [80, 
81]. For a seismic PRA, the basic event probabilities for components are varied 
depending on their seismic fragilities [82]. For example, an event tree is created for a 
seismic event of a certain magnitude, and the basic event probabilities are updated to the 
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expected failure rate given that specific magnitude of earthquake. The same is then done 
for different magnitude seismic events. Then the event tree results are combined to 
illustrate the plant’s seismic risk. 
The Fire Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE) is similar to the fire PRA method with 
the goal of exposing fire vulnerabilities so that their risk can be reduced. FIVE looks at 
the propagation of the fire if barriers or penetration seals fail, and unlike the fire PRA 
method, typically gives full credit to areas that are in compliance with 
10 CFR Appendix R [80].  
The Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) method is similar to a seismic PRA; however, 
the scope is limited. There are four basic steps to performing a SMA. First, a single 
earthquake magnitude is chosen to evaluate. The chosen level for currently operating 
reactors is typically at or below 0.3g peak ground acceleration, although as high as 0.5g 
has also been used in more recent SMAs. Then a walk down is performed to identify 
important SSCs, and those items identified are screened, just as in a seismic PRA. 
Finally, fragility of the items that have not been screened is evaluated. The screening 
process and further evaluation are only done for the chosen magnitude of earthquake, 
thus creating a bounding earthquake that the plant must be able to survive [83].  
When using these methodologies to evaluate multi-unit dependencies, as with parametric 
and causal-based methods, a combination or hybrid of the external event methodologies 
could be used. For the FIVE and SMA models, this would need to take place, as their aim 
when used exclusively is not mean for PRA quantification. Alternatively, a single method 
could be chosen to evaluate the multi-unit dependencies.   
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Chapter 5 Applying Methodologies 
5.1 Introduction 
The four methodologies that have been presented in the previous section are not 
applicable to all of the classifications. Certain methodologies are more appropriate for 
certain classifications. Additionally, while some methods may be applicable, they 
realistically may not be possible because of either lack of data or availability of more 
developed techniques. This chapter will discuss the applicability and practicality of using 
the methodologies for each of the classifications. 
5.2 Initiating Events 
As discussed previously, there are two different subclasses of the initiating events 
classification: definite and conditional. The definite initiating events that will always 
affect multiple units would only need to use the combination methodology to be 
integrated into a multi-unit PRA. The extent that the definite initiating event affects 
multiple units will vary depending on the initiating event. Since the single-unit PRAs 
should contain all of the potential initiating events, they would simply need to be 
combined. For example, if the following cutsets were for a two-unit site where Id 
represents the definite initiating event and I1, I2, and I3 represent other initiating events: 




And the CDF of each unit was as follows:  
 QCDF1 = Idabc + I1def + Idghi Eq. 5.2.1  
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QCDF2 = I2zyx + Idswv + I3ult Eq. 5.2.2  
Then the total CDF of exactly one core damage could be calculated as:  
 
CDFT=CDF1+CDF2 Eq. 5.2.3  
 QCDFT = I1def + I2zyx + I3ult + (Idabc + Idghi + Idswv) Eq. 5.2.4  
 
QCDFT = I1def + I2zyx + I3ult + Id (abc + ghi + swv) Eq. 5.2.5  
 
CDFT=A+B Eq. 5.2.6  
where A represents events not affected by the definite initiating event, B represents 
events affected by the definite initiating event, and 
 
A= I1def + I2zyx + I3ult Eq. 5.2.7  
 
B= Id(abc + ghi + swv) Eq. 5.2.8  
 
For conditional initiating events, two methodologies may be appropriate. One would be a 
parametric method, which would require creating a parameter or several parameters that 
represent the conditional probability of the initiating event affecting multiple units. As 
discussed previously, the metric of interest (exactly one core damage event or nearly 
simultaneous core damage) will change the implementation of a parametric model. For 
example, if A represents events not affected by the initiating event, B represents events 
that may be affected by the initiating event, then the CDFs for a two-unit site would be: 
 CDF1= A1+B1 Eq. 5.2.9  
 CDF2= A2+B2 Eq. 5.2.10  
And if the probability of exactly one core damage was being calculated, then the site 
CDF would be: 
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 CDFT= CDF1+ CDF2 Eq. 5.2.11  
 CDFT = A1+B1 + A2+B2 Eq. 5.2.12  
 CDFT = (A1+ A2) + ρ (B1+B2) Eq. 5.2.13  
where ρ is a dimensionless parameter multiplier that accounts for the increased 
probability of B1 and B2 occurring together because of common initiating event. 
If however, the nearly simultaneous core damage was being calculated for the same two-
unit site, then the site CDF, from Equation 4.3.12, would be:  
 
QCDFT = I1Pr(A1) I3Pr(A2)+ I1Pr(A1)I2[(1-ρ)Pr(B2) + 
ρ(Pr(B2│C)-Pr(B2))]+ I3Pr(A2)I2[(1-ρ)Pr(B1) + ρ(Pr(B1│C)-
Pr(B1))] + I22[(1-ρ)Pr(B1) + ρ(Pr(B1│C)-Pr(B1))] [(1-ρ)Pr(B2) + 
ρ(Pr(B2│C)-Pr(B2))] 
Eq. 5.2.14  
where I represents the initiating event, C represents the existence of the conditional 
initiating event, and ρ is a constant that represents the probability of the conditional 
initiating event affecting multiple units.  
The other option for conditional initiating events would be to use a causal methodology, 
which would map the root cause of the dependency that would possibly be created 
through that initiating event. For example, if the initiating event was loss of service 
water, then the loss could be mapped in a directed graph like the one in Figure 7.  
Page | 44  
 
 
Figure 7: Loss of Service Water Causal Network 
This causal network could be expanded as much as necessary. For example, the loss of 
pump one could be expanded using a physics-of-failure model or these nodes could 
simply be linked to existing fault trees.  
Using a parametric method would be practicable as there are many established methods 
for using parametric methods in nuclear power plant PRAs; however, since some 
initiating events occur so infrequently, the dataset could be skewed. Furthermore, using a 
parametric method would require the user to data mine, as currently there are no 
established databases for how frequently events affect multiple units. Using a causal-
based method would most likely require more effort than a parametric method, but there 
would be a lower likelihood of having biased results because the dataset should be more 
robust. In addition, the causal-based network could be simplified or expanded to 
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accommodate whatever data was available. Conversely, there are no well-established 
causal methods for nuclear power plants as there are for parametric methods.  
5.3 Shared Connection 
There are three different subclasses of the shared connection classification: single SSC, 
time sequential, and standby, as discussed previously. The single SSC dependencies 
would only need to use the combination methodology to be integrated into a multi-unit 
PRA. Since the single SSC should be modeled in all of the single-unit PRAs, they would 
simply need to be combined. For example, if the following cutsets for a two-unit site, 
where b was the shared component between the units, were:  




And the CDF of each unit was as follows:  
 QCDF1 =I1 abc+ I2 def+ I3 gbh Eq. 5.3.1  
 
QCDF2 = I4 zby+ I5 xwv+ I6 ubt Eq. 5.3.2  
Then the total CDF for exactly one unit could be calculated as:  
 
CDFT=CDF1+CDF2 Eq. 5.3.3  
 QCDFT = I2 def+ I5 xwv+ (I1 abc+ I3 gbh+ I4 zby+ I6 ubt) Eq. 5.3.4  
 
CDFT=A+B Eq. 5.3.5  
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where A represents cutsets that do not contain the shared component and B represents 
cutsets with the shared component. For a shared system, rather than merging cutsets, the 
event trees would need to be combined in a similar fashion. 
For time sequential sharing dependencies, three methodologies would be appropriate. 
One would be a parametric method, which would require creation of a parameter to 
represent the conditional probability that the SSC is available for each unit. As previously 
discussed, the metric of interest (exactly one core damage event or nearly simultaneous 
core damage) will change the implementation of a parametric model. For example, if A 
represents events that do not contain the shared components and B represents events that 
contain the shared components, then the CDFs for a two-unit site would be: 
 CDF1= A1+B1 Eq. 5.3.6  
 CDF2= A2+B2 Eq. 5.3.7  
And if the probability of exactly one core damage was being calculated, then the site 
CDF would be: 
 CDFT= CDF1+ CDF2 Eq. 5.3.8  
 CDFT = A1+B1 + A2+B2 Eq. 5.3.9  
 CDFT = (A1+ A2) + ρ (B1+B2) Eq. 5.3.10  
where ρ is a dimensionless parameter multiplier that accounts for the increased 
probability of B1 and B2 occurring together because of shared components. 
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If, however, the nearly simultaneous core damage was being calculated for the same two-
unit site, then the site CDF, from Equation 4.3.12, would be:  
 
QCDFT = I1Pr(A1) I3Pr(A2)+ I1Pr(A1)I4[(1-ρ)Pr(B2) + 
ρ(Pr(B2│C)-Pr(B2))]+ I3Pr(A2)I2[(1-ρ)Pr(B1) + ρ(Pr(B1│C)-
Pr(B1))] + I2[(1-ρ)Pr(B1) + ρ(Pr(B1│C)-Pr(B1))] I4[(1-ρ)Pr(B2) + 
ρ(Pr(B2│C)-Pr(B2))] 
Eq. 5.3.11  
where I represents the initiating event, C represents the existence of the shared 
components, and ρ is a constant that represents the probability of the shared components 
affecting multiple units.  
If an entire system was shared, then a house event would need to be created in the PRA to 
reflect the conditional probability of the system being available. This house event would 
change the basic event probabilities of the components in the shared system using a 
developed parameter.  
Use of a causal methodology would map the root cause of events that could cause the 
SSC to become unavailable simultaneously. This causal network could be very simple, as 
in Figure 8, or it could map all failure modes down to the failure mechanism, such as 
fatigue or wear. In the figure, a two-unit site is represented that has a dedicated EDG for 
each unit and a swing EDG that can service either unit. The accuracy of using such a 
model would be proportional to the detail of the model created, if appropriate 
intermediate modeling assumptions are made.  
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Figure 8: EDG Binary Decision Diagram 
The third option would be to incorporate the SSC into existing event trees, which would 
require the assumption of a dominant unit. For example, to account for the dependencies 
between a two-unit site that has two main EDGs and a swing diesel, it could be 
represented as:  
 
Figure 9: EDG Event Tree 
where “CD” is core damage on at least one unit, and “ok” indicates both units have 
successful use of the diesels. This same approach could be used whether it was a 
component, structure, or system that was shared.   
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Depending on the SSC, the parametric data could overemphasize certain failure 
mechanisms, but there should be enough data available for active components. However, 
a parametric approach makes it difficult to truly account for the time-sensitive nature of 
these types of shared systems. Using a causal methodology would likely require the most 
effort, and depending on the SSC, there could be a lack of data in order to form a causal 
network. It would be important to use a dynamic causal network that could account for 
the time-sequential sharing aspect. The detail of the chosen causal method, as outlined 
previously, would determine the model accuracy. Incorporation into the existing PRA 
would require the least amount of effort; however, the accuracy would be compromised, 
since the assumption would have to be made that one unit would be the primary unit. 
Additionally, latent errors in the single-unit PRAs could be carried into the multi-unit 
PRA. 
For standby systems, two methodologies would be appropriate: causal modeling and 
incorporation into existing event trees. Using a causal methodology would simply map 
which events could cause the SSC to become unavailable simultaneously, just as in the 
time-sequential sharing. It would not, however, be important to have a dynamic causal 
network because the timing of the event would not greatly influence the availability of 
the system. Also, just as in time-sequentially shared SSCs, shared standby systems could 
be incorporated into the existing event trees. If one of the standby systems was 
incorporated into existing event trees, again, one unit would have to be assumed to be the 
primary unit [6]. Using a causal methodology could prove difficult, depending on the 
SSC and the degree of detail used. Whereas, incorporation into existing fault trees would 
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not require much effort, but the accuracy of the PRA may be compromised, just as in the 
time-sequential sharing.    
5.4 Identical Component 
For the identical component class, two methodologies could be used to model this 
dependency. Parametric modeling is one option and would likely be an extension of the 
current common cause failure model used for the single-unit PRAs. As discussed 
previously, the metric of interest (exactly one core damage event or nearly simultaneous 
core damage) will change the implementation of a parametric model. For example, if A 
represents events that do not contain an identical component and B represents events that 
contain an identical component, then the CDFs for a two-unit site would be: 
 CDF1= A1+B1 Eq. 5.4.1  
 CDF2= A2+B2 Eq. 5.4.2  
And if the probability of exactly one core damage was being calculated, then the site 
CDF would be: 
 CDFT= CDF1+ CDF2 Eq. 5.4.3  
 CDFT = A1+B1 + A2+B2 Eq. 5.4.4  
 CDFT = (A1+ A2) + ρ (B1+B2) Eq. 5.4.5  
where ρ is a dimensionless parameter multiplier that accounts for the increased 
probability of B1 and B2 occurring together because of identical components. 
If, however, the nearly simultaneous core damage was being calculated for the same two-
unit site, then the site CDF, from Equation 4.3.12, would be:  
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QCDFT = I1Pr(A1) I3Pr(A2)+ I1Pr(A1)I4[(1-ρ)Pr(B2) + 
ρ(Pr(B2│C)-Pr(B2))]+ I3Pr(A2)I2[(1-ρ)Pr(B1) + ρ(Pr(B1│C)-
Pr(B1))] + I2[(1-ρ)Pr(B1) + ρ(Pr(B1│C)-Pr(B1))] I4[(1-ρ)Pr(B2) + 
ρ(Pr(B2│C)-Pr(B2))] 
Eq. 5.4.6  
where I represents the initiating event, C represents the existence of the identical 
components, and ρ is a constant that represents the probability of the identical component 
commonality affecting multiple units.  
Using a causal methodology would model the physics-of-failure of the component [69]. 
For example, if the same type of compressor was used on both units, a causal network 
like the one in Figure 10 could be used for all compressors at the plant. The equations at 
the bottom of the figure show the actual physics of the failure of the compressor. 
 
Figure 10: Compressor BBN (based on original figure by M. Modarres, 3 May 2010) 
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Using a parametric method would almost certainly be more consistent with the rest of the 
PRA and require the least amount of effort; however, it could also perpetuate any existing 
problems in the single-unit PRAs. Additionally, for larger component groups current 
parametric methods may not be sufficient. In these cases, new parameters would need to 
be developed to accurately account for common cause failure. Using a causal-based 
method would require more effort, but for most components, there should be enough data 
to map the physical failure of the component.  
5.5 Proximity Dependency 
For the proximity class, one methodology could be used. This would be to extend the 
single-unit external events PRA. This method would only be viable if every unit onsite 
had an external event PRA. For example, if a fire PRA had already been completed for 
each unit, then the fire zones that had been identified could be reconsidered for a multi-
unit affect. The same thing could be done for seismic events and other external events. 
The focus would simply shift from the effect of these events on a single unit to the effect 
on multiple units. 
This extension could also occur by using one of the external event models presented in 
Section 4.5. A single model or a combination of these models could be developed to 
accurately reflect a site’s risk profile. For example, if a site had a high frequency of 
tornadoes, then the proximity dependencies analysis could be more focused on the effect 
of high wind events.  
Extending the current external events PRA may not capture all of the dependencies 
because of the state of the existing PRA. Using a methodology similar to existing 
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external event methodologies would require a more in-depth analysis; however, it would 
allow the analysis to be done while the entire site was considered, rather than just one 
unit, and would not contain any previous bias that may have occurred during the single-
unit external events analysis. 
5.6 Human Dependency 
As previously discussed, the human dependency class has two subclasses: pre-initiating 
event and post-initiating event. For the pre-initiating event subclass, two methodologies 
would be appropriate. A parametric methodology would require creation of a parameter 
or several parameters that represent the conditional probability of a human error 
occurring given the occurrence of another event. As discussed previously, the metric of 
interest (exactly one core damage event or nearly simultaneous core damage) will change 
the implementation of a parametric model. For example, if A represents events that do 
not contain the human action and B represents events that contain the human action, and 
the CDFs for a two-unit site are: 
 CDF1= A1+B1 Eq. 5.6.1  
 CDF2= A2+B2 Eq. 5.6.2  
Then, if the probability of exactly one core damage was being calculated, the site CDF 
would be: 
 CDFT= CDF1+ CDF2 Eq. 5.6.3  
 CDFT = A1+B1 + A2+B2 Eq. 5.6.4  
 CDFT = (A1+ A2) + ρ (B1+B2) Eq. 5.6.5  
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where ρ is a dimensionless parameter multiplier that accounts for the increased 
probability of B1 and B2 occurring together because of the human action. 
If, however, the nearly simultaneous core damage was being calculated for the same two-
unit site, then the site CDF, from Equation 4.3.12, would be:  
 
QCDFT = I1Pr(A1) I3Pr(A2)+ I1Pr(A1)I4[(1-ρ)Pr(B2) + 
ρ(Pr(B2│C)-Pr(B2))]+ I3Pr(A2)I2[(1-ρ)Pr(B1) + ρ(Pr(B1│C)-
Pr(B1))] + I2[(1-ρ)Pr(B1) + ρ(Pr(B1│C)-Pr(B1))] I4[(1-ρ)Pr(B2) + 
ρ(Pr(B2│C)-Pr(B2))] 
Eq. 5.6.6  
where I represents the initiating event, C represents the existence of the human action, 
and ρ is a constant that represents the probability of the human action affecting multiple 
units.  
A causal methodology would simply map the root cause of the human failure. For 
example, physical factors, memorized information, and mental states could be 
considered, as seen in Figure 11 [84]. This figure considers internal and external 
performance influencing factors (PIFs) and operator behavior (by looking at information, 
decision, and action). If causal modeling was used, there would be no reason to separate 
pre-initiating event and post-initiating event human actions; however, the delineation 
would be necessary for a parametric methodology, as the conditional probabilities would 
be very different.  
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Figure 11: Factors that Affect Human Performance [84] 
For the post-initiating event subclass, there are also two methodologies that would be 
appropriate. The first, a parametric methodology, would require creation of a parameter 
that represents the conditional probability of a human event occurring given that an 
initiating event had occurred and a human failure event had also occurred. Again, the 
metric of interest (exactly one core damage event or nearly simultaneous core damage) 
will change the implementation of a parametric model. For example, if A are events not 
affected by the initiating event, B are events that are affected by the initiating event but 
not the human action, C are events that are affected by the initiating event and the human 
action, and the following CDFs for a two-unit site were: 
 CDF1= A1+B1+C1 Eq. 5.6.7  
 CDF2= A2+B2+C2 Eq. 5.6.8  
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And if the probability of exactly one core damage was being calculated, then the site 
CDF would be: 
 CDFT= CDF1+ CDF2 Eq. 5.6.9  
 CDFT = A1+B1 +C1+ A2+B2 +C2 Eq. 5.6.10  
 CDFT = (A1+ A2) + ρ (B1+B2) + τ (C1+C2) Eq. 5.6.11  
where ρ is a dimensionless parameter multiplier that accounts for the increased 
probability of B1 and B2 occurring together because of common initiating event and τ is a 
dimensionless parameter multiplier that accounts for the increased probability of C1 and 
C2 occurring together because of both the human action and the initiating event. 
If, however, the nearly simultaneous core damage was being calculated for the same two-
unit site, then the site CDF, using the same logic as was used in Equations 4.3.6-12, 
would be:  
 
QCDFT = I1Pr(A1) I3Pr(A2)+ I1Pr(A1)I2[(1-ρ)Pr(B2) + 
ρ(Pr(B2│D)-Pr(B2))]+ I1Pr(A1)I2[(1-τ)Pr(C2) + τ(Pr(C2│E)-Pr(C2))] 
+ I3Pr(A2)I2[(1-ρ)Pr(B1) + ρ(Pr(B1│D)-Pr(B1))]+ 
I3Pr(A2)I2[(1-τ)Pr(C1) + τ(Pr(C1│E)-Pr(C1))] + I22[(1-ρ)(Pr(B1) + 
ρ(Pr(B1│D)-Pr(B1)))((1-ρ)Pr(B2) + ρ(Pr(B2│D)-Pr(B2))) + 
((1-ρ)Pr(B1) + ρ(Pr(B1│D)-Pr(B1)))((1-τ)Pr(C2) + 
τ(Pr(C2│E)-Pr(C2))) + ((1-τ)Pr(C1) + 
τ(Pr(C1│E)-Pr(C1)))((1-ρ)Pr(B2) + ρ(Pr(B2│D)-Pr(B2))) + 
((1-τ)Pr(C1) + τ(Pr(C1│E)-Pr(C1))) ((1-τ)Pr(C2) + 
τ(Pr(C2│E)-Pr(C2)))] 
Eq. 5.6.12  
where I is the initiating event, D is the existence of the initiating event, E is the 
concurrent existence of the initiating event and the human action, ρ is a constant that 
represents the probability of the initiating event affecting multiple units, and τ is a 
constant that represents the probability of the initiating event and the human action 
affecting multiple units.  
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The second option would be a causal methodology that would simply map the root cause 
of the human error. This approach, as discussed previously, would not be any different 
than the causal method chosen for the pre-initiating event subclass.  
For either the pre-initiating event or the post-initiating event subclass, the use of a 
parametric model would be extremely difficult as there is virtually no assimilated data for 
the effect of human actions at a nuclear power plant. A causal-based method would 
require a significant amount of effort as the root cause of a human action would need to 
be determined; nonetheless, there are codes that have been developed for this purpose 
[84]. However, the evaluation of past events could be challenging. For example, there 
would have to be an evaluation as to whether the incorrect valve installation was because 
the maintenance team did not think safety was important, because they were not paying 
attention to the task, or because they were simply not qualified to perform the installation. 
For the causal-based method, it would also be necessary to use expert judgment to 
quantify the network. 
5.7 Organizational Dependency 
For the organizational classification, two different methodologies could be used. One 
would be to create a traditional PRA model of organizational factors and incorporate 
organizational factors into the existing single-unit fault trees. If this methodology was 
chosen, it would also be appropriate to use a parametric methodology to represent the 
conditional probability of an event given that an organizational failure has occurred.  
The second methodology would be to create a causal model of organizational factors. 
This method would map the organizational failures to potential equipment or human 
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failures. For example, the safety culture and organizational culture would be considered 
to map the different relationships as seen in Figure 12 [63].  
 
Figure 12: Factors that Affect Organizational Performance [63] 
A parametric method would be extremely difficult to quantify, as there is no data 
currently collected at nuclear power plants to identify organizational failures. Given the 
integral nature of organizational factors, using a causal model would be the preferred and 
most complete methodology. There are methods, such as SoTeRiA, that could be used 
[63]. However, no matter what method is chosen, it will be difficult to quantify the 
factors and relationships that affect organizational performance as it is an extremely 
complex and often subjective issue.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusions 
Currently, multi-unit nuclear power plant PRAs consider the risk from each unit 
separately and do not consider combination events between the units. To gain an accurate 
view of the site’s risk profile, the CDF for the site rather than the unit must be 
considered. This thesis has presented a classification system that utilizes existing single-
unit PRAs and combines them into a multi-unit PRA. Six main commonality classes that 
can cause multiple units to be dependent have been presented: initiating events, shared 
connections, identical components, proximity dependencies, human dependencies, and 
organizational dependencies. A seventh class, independent events, was only marginally 
discussed because it does not address dependencies between the units. 
This thesis has also discussed multi-unit events that have occurred at U.S. nuclear power 
plants and the potential consequences of those events. It was found that nine percent of 
reportable events an eleven-year period affected multiple units. Furthermore, two percent 
of those that affected multiple units were safety significant. Additionally, it was found 
that multi-site issues have occurred in the United States.  
Four methodologies were examined that could quantify classifications: combination, 
parametric, causal-based, and extension methods. The applicability and practicality of 
using the methods for each classification was also discussed. A summary of the 
applicability of the methods for each classification can be seen in Table 7. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, these methodologies are not unconditionally applicable. For example, for 
human dependencies, in order for a parametric model to be used, data would have to be 
gathered about the effects of human actions at a nuclear power plant.  
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Table 7: Applicability of Methodologies for Each Classification 
Classification and Subclasses Applicable Methodology 
Initiating Event  
Definite Combination 
Conditional Parametric or causal 
Shared Connection  
Single Combination 
Time Sequential Parametric, causal, or extension 
Standby Causal or extension 
Identical component Parametric or causal 
Proximity Extension 
Human  
Pre-initiating event Parametric or causal 
Post-initiating event Parametric or causal 
Organizational Extension or causal 
6.2 Recommendations 
Future areas of research could include analyzing each methodology for each of the 
proposed classifications, as seen in Table 7, to determine the most appropriate technique, 
technical impediments, as well as the need for any expansions. Additionally, a feasibility 
study could be done to combine existing single-unit PRAs using the current state-of-
practice methods. This could also be done for nontraditional reactor technologies such as 
small modular reactors and advanced reactor technologies.  
Before a feasibility study could be done, the dependencies of each component of the plant 
would need to be identified in some sort of dependency matrix. This is already typically 
done for single-unit PRAs; traditionally, only hard physical connections were included, 
such as a motor-operated valve needing to have power from a predefined source. These 
matrices allow the PRA model developer to know what to consider when creating the 
PRA. This same thing would need to be done for proximity, human, and organizational 
dependencies. For proximity dependencies, room location, nearby doors and conduits, 
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and the location with respect to other units onsite would need to be noted. For human 
dependencies, the operator or the maintenance team member responsible for the action, as 
well as whether the action occurs before or after the event would need to be noted. For 
organizational dependencies, the department responsible for the system, the procedures 
used when operating the component, and the training that is given on the SSCs would 
need to be noted.  
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 5, some of the methodologies require a larger body 
of knowledge, as well as more advanced techniques, before they are feasible for use in 
nuclear power plant PRAs. Additionally, if the classification proposed in this thesis was 
extended to a Level 3 PRA or used for severe accident management, consideration would 
need to be given to sites with different reactor types, as the severe accident progression 
would vary for each unit.   
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Appendix 1 
Table 8: Summary of Multi-Unit LER Classifications 
LER Number Classification Subclass Summary 
2772001001 Human Post-Initiator 
After an electrical transient, 
the operators did not correctly 
close breakers which resulted 
in a condition in which two 
out of four emergency buses 
per unit would not have 
automatically received power 
from their respective EDGs in 
the event of a LOOP. 
2372011001 Human Pre-Initiator 
Stop logs were installed on 
both sides of a bay rendering 
the containment cooling 
service water inoperable for 
two units.  
2662000002 Human Pre-Initiator 
Surveillances were missed for 
emergency core cooling 
system valves on two units.  
3212000001 Human Pre-Initiator 
Water level sensors in the 
suppression pool were 
installed incorrectly on two 
units.  
3272009007 Human Pre-Initiator 
A technical specification 
required action was missed 
for two units. 
3612003001 Human Pre-Initiator 
Technician performing work 
on Unit 3 misidentified a 
reference terminal and made 
a connection to a relay for 
Unit 2, which caused a 
reactor trip at Unit 2. Unit 3 
was defueled.  
3612007003 Human Pre-Initiator 
Flow meters for ultimate heat 
sink were not calibrated 
correctly causing incorrect 
adjustments on two units.  
3872002005 Human Pre-Initiator 
Two consecutive 
maintenance mechanics filled 
a dry shielded canister with 
argon gas rather than helium 
gas. This event could have 
had adverse effects on stored 
spent fuel.  
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LER Number Classification Subclass Summary 
4132006003 Human Pre-Initiator 
Igniter glow plug coils were 
installed incorrectly on two 
units.  
4242007001 Human Pre-Initiator 
Top-mounted auxiliary 
contact blocks were not 
installed correctly on two 
units.  
4542005001 Human Pre-Initiator 
Employee falsified 
surveillance procedures on 
two units.  
5282003004 Human Pre-Initiator 
Control switch contact blocks 
were incorrectly installed on 
three units.  
2492004006 Identical Component   
The shafts of the main turbine 
generators, which are nearly 
identical, were found to be 
cracked on two units.  
2502005004 Identical Component   
The same inadequate fuse 
type was installed on two 
units’ emergency 
containment filter fan.  
2652005002 Identical Component   
Main steam line electromatic 
relief valve actuators were 
damaged because of 
vibrations on two units.  
2692010001 Identical Component   
A valve that released foreign 
material was installed on two 
units.  
2692011004 Identical Component   
A specific type of particulate 
radiation monitor was found 
to be inadequate, which 
resulted in three units 
violating technical 
specifications.  
2752008001 Identical Component   
It was found that similar 
solenoid valves could 
malfunction on two units 
because of valve aging. 
2772000002 Identical Component   
The air coolant and jacket 
coolant heat exchangers for 
emergency diesel generators 
for two units were found to 
be inadequate.  
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LER Number Classification Subclass Summary 
2802010002 Identical Component   
Aluminum conduit seal 
penetrations that were used 
on two units were found to be 
inadequate.  
2822000001 Identical Component   
Steam exclusion dampers 
were found to have a 
potential for failure on two 
units.  
2822001005 Identical Component   
The same breaker type, which 
is susceptible to poor 
electrical connection, was 
operated on two units.  
2822010004 Identical Component   
The same battery chargers, 
which have the potential to 
stop providing output, were 
used on two units.  
3062006002 Identical Component   
Neutron flux monitor 
channels were spliced 
incorrectly on two units. 
3162003004 Identical Component   
The weight of the ice baskets 
was found to be below the 
requirements of the technical 
specifications on two units.  
3172002004 Identical Component   
Loose cable connectors on 
two units' post-accident 
monitoring systems could 
have prevented them from 
fulfilling their safety 
function.  
3212006003 Identical Component   
The same valve was used on 
two units and caused both 
units to be in violation of 
technical specifications.  
3232002001 Identical Component   
Bonnet fasteners used for 
atmospheric steam dump 
valves that were susceptible 
to stress corrosion cracking, 
were used for two units.  
3232003007 Identical Component   
Battery chargers for two units 
were installed with a control 
circuit design deficiency.  
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3232005001 Identical Component   
The same pressurizer safety 
valves were used on two units 
and have a history of random 
spread lift.  
3252005006 Identical Component   
The same inappropriate 
setpoint was used for two 




3252008003 Identical Component   
It was found that the design 
of two identical reactor-
building cranes was 
inadequate.  
3252010004 Identical Component   
Two units’ emergency diesel 
generators had collector rings 
that were subject to 
corrosion.  
3382010001 Identical Component   
Aluminum conduit seal 
penetrations were found to be 
inadequate on two units.  
3482001002 Identical Component   
Large penetration fire seals 
that were used on two units 
were found to be inadequate.  
3612002001 Identical Component   
Certain relays were found to 
be susceptible to aging-
related failure on two units.  
3612006003 Identical Component   
The same inadequate 
electrical logic was used for 
two units' emergency diesel 
generators.  
3612010004 Identical Component   
Emergency diesel generator 
room emergency fan nose 
cones were subject to the 
same corrosive environment 
on two units.  
3622002002 Identical Component   
A faulty breaker was installed 
on two units.  
3622006002 Identical Component   
An inadequate gasket design 
was used on two units.  
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3622007004 Identical Component   
A contaminated batch 
(moisture contamination) of 
hydraulic dump valves was 
installed on two units.  
3692005001 Identical Component   
Containment atmosphere 
particulate radioactivity 
monitors were incorrectly 
operated for two units.  
3692006001 Identical Component   
Ice condenser floor cooling 
valves for two units were 
operated incorrectly.  
3692011002 Identical Component   
Valves on two units were 
being operated incorrectly.  
3742002002 Identical Component   
The same type of 
potentiometer, which was not 
designed adequately, was 
used on two units’ emergency 
diesel generators.  
3872002002 Identical Component   
The same inadequate valve 
was used on two units’ main 
steam isolation valves.  
3872003007 Identical Component   
The oil used for maintaining 
the core spray pumps was 
changed for two units. This 
change, because of the 
interaction with the old oil, 
caused foaming in the pumps.  
4132007001 Identical Component   
Certain associated circuits, 
which are used, were found to 
be inadequate on two units.  
4132007002 Identical Component   
The same inadequate 
submarine hatch design was 
used for two units.  
4242006002 Identical Component   
Problems were identified 
with a specific transmitter 
type that was used on two 
units.  
4462001001 Identical Component   
Problems were identified 
with a light socket that was 
used on two units.  
4552005001 Identical Component   
Software that is common to 
two units was found to have a 
logic fault.  
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5282001003 Identical Component   
Control element assemblies 
with similar design and 
operation were found to have 
cracks on three units.  
2662000010 Initiating Event Conditional 
Divers working on Unit 2 
piping became unresponsive, 
so Unit 1 was tripped due to 
concern for diver safety. 
2752007001 Initiating Event Conditional 
A loss of offsite startup 
power caused two units' 
emergency diesel generators 
to start.  
2962005003 Initiating Event Conditional 
An electrical disturbance 
caused two units to have a 
reduction in power.  
3242003004 Initiating Event Conditional 
A turbine trip on Unit 2 
caused an electrical transient, 
which affected some Unit 1 
systems.  
3252006007 Initiating Event Conditional 
An electrical disturbance 
caused two units' emergency 
diesel generators to start.  
3382009004 Initiating Event Conditional 
A human-induced loss of 
offsite power caused two 
units to trip.  
3612001002 Initiating Event Conditional An electrical disturbance caused two units to trip.  
3612008002 Initiating Event Conditional An electrical disturbance caused two units to trip.  
3612008003 Initiating Event Conditional An electrical disturbance caused two units to trip.  
3732001001 Initiating Event Conditional 
An electrical disturbance 
caused two units to have a 
reduction in power.  
3872002006 Initiating Event Conditional 
A fire caused a partial loss of 
offsite power, which affected 
two units. 
4132007003 Initiating Event Conditional 
An electrical disturbance 
caused two units' emergency 
diesel generators to start.  
4452003003 Initiating Event Conditional An electrical disturbance caused two units to trip.  
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4982003001 Initiating Event Conditional An electrical disturbance caused two units to trip.  
5292004003 Initiating Event Conditional 
An electrical disturbance 
caused two units' emergency 
diesel generators to start.  
2372005003 Initiating Event Definite 
A loss of offsite power 
caused two units to enter a 
limiting condition of 
operation.  
2592011001 Initiating Event Definite 
Severe weather caused a loss 
of offsite power event, which 
caused three units to trip.  
2692007001 Initiating Event Definite 
An electrical disturbance at a 
switching station caused an 
electrical disturbance, which 
caused two units to trip.  
2752001001 Initiating Event Definite 
An external fire caused an 
electrical disturbance, which 
caused emergency diesel 
generators to start at two 
units.  
2752011003 Initiating Event Definite 
A tsunami warning caused 
temporary relocation of plant 
personnel at two units. 
2772003004 Initiating Event Definite 
An offsite electrical grid 
disturbance caused two units 
to trip.  
2802003004 Initiating Event Definite 
A hurricane caused an 
electrical disturbance, which 
caused two units to trip.  
2962004002 Initiating Event Definite 
A lightning strike on the grid 
caused an electrical 
disturbance, which caused 
speed perturbations on two 
units' main turbines.  
3252000001 Initiating Event Definite 
A human-induced loss of 
offsite power caused two 
units' emergency diesel 
generators to start.  
3382011003 Initiating Event Definite 
A seismic event, which led to 
a loss of offsite power event, 
caused two units to trip.  
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4132006001 Initiating Event Definite A loss of offsite power caused two units to trip.  
5282004006 Initiating Event Definite A loss of offsite power caused three units to trip.  
2372005001 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
2372009007 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
2502000002 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to 
cause both units to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
2502000003 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
2502006008 Organizational   
A test methodology that was 
used for two units was found 
to be inadequate.  
2502010001 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
2542005001 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
2592011010 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
2602000002 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied analysis 
that was used to develop 
procedures on two units was 
found to be incorrect. 
2602002003 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied analysis 
that was used for algorithms 
on two units was found to be 
incorrect. 
2602003004 Organizational   A design deficiency that affected two units was found.  
2652001002 Organizational   A design deficiency that affected two units was found.  
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2662000005 Organizational   
An analysis used for two 
units' procedures was found 
to be inadequate.  
2662000008 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures that 
were used for two units were 
found to be inadequate.  
2662001001 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
2662001003 Organizational   
An unanalyzed condition was 
found by which the internal 
pressure may exceed the 
design pressure of 
containment for two units.  
2662003001 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
incorrect. 
2662005001 Organizational   
The fire organization plan 
used for two units was found 
to be inadequate.  
2662005002 Organizational   
The fire organization plan 
used for two units was found 
to be inadequate.  
2662005003 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied 
calculation that was used for 
setpoints for two units was 
found to be incorrect.  
2662005004 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
2662005005 Organizational   
Calculations used for two 
units’ electrical distribution 
systems were found to be 
incorrect.  
2662005006 Organizational   
A calculation that was used to 
demonstrate regulatory 
compliance for two units was 
found to be incorrect.  
2662005007 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
2662007008 Organizational   
A calculation that was used 
for setpoints on two units was 
found to be incorrect.  
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2662010003 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
inadequate. 
2692000004 Organizational   
Symmetrical technical 
specifications for three units 
were found to be inadequate.  
2692000005 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
2692001001 Organizational   
An analysis, which was used 
in technical specifications for 
three units, was found to be 
inaccurate.  
2692002001 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on three 
units.  
2692006002 Organizational   
Drawings and field walk 
downs that were used for 
safety function analysis for 
three units, were found to be 
inaccurate.  
2692011006 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
2702011001 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied 
calculation that was used for 
two units was found to be 
incorrect.  
2722000004 Organizational   
An engineering evaluation 
that was used for two units 
was found to be incorrect.  
2722002001 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied 
calculation that was used for 
setpoints for two units was 
found to be incorrect.  
2722005001 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
defective. 
2752000006 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
2752002001 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied 
calculation that was used for 
setpoints for two units was 
found to be incorrect.  
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2752010003 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of the design of two units' 
offsite power systems caused 
both units to be in violation 
of technical specifications.  
2752010004 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
defective. 
2752011002 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
2772005002 Organizational   
Analyses of interim 
configurations for three units 
were found to be insufficient.  
2772010004 Organizational   
An operational assumption 
that was used for two units 
was found to be inadequate.  
2772011002 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
2802003006 Organizational   
A symmetrical analysis that 
was used for two units was 
found to be insufficient.  
2822000002 Organizational   
Vendor-supplied fuel for two 
units was found to have 
higher fuel pellet densities 
than assumed in the spent 
fuel pool criticality analysis. 
2822001001 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
2822003002 Organizational   
A fire analysis that was used 
for two units was found to be 
inadequate.  
2822007002 Organizational   
A fire analysis that was used 
for two units was found to be 
inadequate.  
2822007003 Organizational   
A fire analysis that was used 
for two units was found to be 
inadequate.  
2822009004 Organizational   
An analysis used for two 
units' residual heat removal 
system was found to be 
inadequate.  
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2822009006 Organizational   
A high-energy line break 
analysis that was used for two 
units was found to be 
incorrect.  
3152000002 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
3152000003 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
3152000006 Organizational   
A misinterpretation of 
technical specifications for 
two units' emergency diesel 
fuel oil system caused both 
units to be in violation of 
technical specifications.  
3152001002 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3152005002 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of technical specifications for 
two units' emergency diesel 
generators caused both units 
to be in violation of technical 
specifications.  
3152008003 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of technical specifications for 
two units' essential service 
water system caused both 
units to be in violation of 
technical specifications.  
3162002002 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3172000003 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3172002002 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3172005003 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied power 
calculation that was used for 
two units was found to be 
incorrect.  
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3172006003 Organizational   
A high-energy line break 
analysis that was used for two 
units' procedures was found 
to be incorrect.  
3182008001 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied 
calculation that was used for 
setpoints for two units was 
found to be incorrect.  
3212001003 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied analysis, 
which was used for setpoints 
for two units, was found to be 
incorrect.  
3212002003 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied 
calculation that was used for 
setpoints for two units was 
found to be incorrect.  
3212006001 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3252003002 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied 
calculation that was used for 
two units was found to be 
incorrect.  
3252005001 Organizational   
A software parameter change 
that was completed on two 
units was found to be 
incorrect.  
3252006006 Organizational   
Inadequate understanding of 
the design of two units led to 
both units’ technical 
specifications to be non-
conservative.  
3272002001 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied 
calculation that was used for 
setpoints for two units was 
found to be incorrect.  
3272006001 Organizational   
The same logical error was 
applied to two units' fire 
analysis, which could have 
caused damage to reactor 
coolant pumps in certain 
postulated fires.  
Page | 75  
 
LER Number Classification Subclass Summary 
3342000001 Organizational   
Operator guidance for two 
unit's supplemental leak 
collection and release system 
was found to be deficient.  
3352000001 Organizational   
The original design of two 
units did not comply with 
regulatory requirements for 
fire protection.  
3352000003 Organizational   
A misunderstanding of 
regulations caused two units' 
control room minimum 
staffing levels to be unmet.  
3352006005 Organizational   
The original design of two 
units did not comply with 
regulatory requirements for 
fire protection.  
3382002002 Organizational   
Symmetrical deficient 
procedures used on two units 
caused the units to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
3382005001 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3382010003 Organizational   A design deficiency that affected two units was found.  
3382011002 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3482009002 Organizational   
A design calculation that was 
used for two units was found 
to be incorrect.  
3522008004 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3612000001 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
3612000004 Organizational   
An analysis for the 
emergency core cooling 
system for two units was 
found to be incorrect.  
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3612000007 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of technical specifications 
caused two units to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
3612000008 Organizational   
The control room isolation 
system, which is common to 
two units, was actuated.  
3612000009 Organizational   
Incomplete procedures 
caused two units to miss 
surveillances.  
3612000012 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of technical specifications for 
two units' boration flow path 
caused both units to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
3612000015 Organizational   
Inadequate documentation 
caused two units' post-
accident monitoring 
instrumentation containment 
isolation valves to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
3612002002 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3612002003 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3612002004 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
defective. 
3612002005 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3612008007 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3612010003 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of technical specifications for 
two units' containment 
isolation valves caused both 
units to be in violation of 
technical specifications.  
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3612010005 Organizational   
A seismic analysis that was 
used for two units was found 
to be inadequate.  
3612010006 Organizational   
The safety culture at a site 
caused two units to violate 
technical specifications.  
3612011001 Organizational   
A misunderstanding of a 
safety analyses for two units 
caused two units to have a 
potential loss of safety 
function.  
3622000001 Organizational   
Symmetrical deficient 
procedures used on two units 
caused both units to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications. 
3662001001 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
for setpoints on two units 
were found to be deficient.  
3692000002 Organizational   
Symmetrical technical 
specifications for two units 
were found to be inadequate.  
3692000003 Organizational   
An analysis, which was used 
for two units' spent fuel pool, 
was found to be inadequate.  
3692007004 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3732000001 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
defective. 
3732000003 Organizational   
A symmetrical analysis that 
was used to calculate 
setpoints on two units was 
found to be insufficient.  
3732000004 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
3732010003 Organizational   
A seismic analysis that was 
used for two units was found 
to be incorrect.  
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3872000001 Organizational   
An inadequate system design 
led to missed regulatory 
required testing on two units.  
3872000006 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
3872000009 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of technical specifications for 
two units' containment 
boundary valves caused both 
units to be in violation of 
technical specifications.  
3872001001 Organizational   
A design analysis that was 
used for two units was found 
to be incorrect.  
3872001003 Organizational   
A power calculation that was 
used for two units was found 
to be incorrect.  
3872005001 Organizational   
A misinterpretation of 
guidance for two units' 
containment ventilation 
caused both units to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
3872011001 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
4132002004 Organizational   
An engineering evaluation 
that was used for two units' 
chiller rooms were found to 
be inadequate. 
4242005002 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied 
calculation that was used for 
setpoints for two units was 
found to be incorrect.  
4452001001 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
4452001003 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
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4452002001 Organizational   
An inadequate system design 
led to two unit's emergency 
diesel generators being 
inoperable.  
4452010002 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of technical specifications for 
two units' main feedwater 
pumps caused both units to 
be in violation of technical 
specifications.  
4452010003 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
4452011001 Organizational   
Vendor-supplied guidance 
that was used for calculations 
for two units was found to be 
incorrect.  
4542000001 Organizational   
The in-service testing 
program used for two units 
was found to be inadequate.  
4542001001 Organizational   
A power calculation that was 
used for two units was found 
to be incorrect.  
4542001002 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
4542003001 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of two units' filtration system 
actuation instrumentation 
(FSAI) caused both units' 
FSAI to be inoperable. 
4542003003 Organizational   
A flow calculation that was 
used for two units was found 
to be inaccurate.  
4542005002 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
4542005003 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of technical specifications for 
two units' containment 
penetrations caused both 
units to be in violation of 
technical specifications.  
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4542005004 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
4542006002 Organizational   
A symmetrical design 
deficiency was found on two 
units.  
4542008002 Organizational   
A design calculation that was 
used for two units was found 
to be incorrect.  
4542009001 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
4542011001 Organizational   
Vendor-supplied guidance 
that was used for calculations 
for two units was found to be 
incorrect.  
4542011003 Organizational   
An analysis that was used for 
the auxiliary feedwater 
system on two units was 
found to be incorrect.  
4562002003 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of technical specifications for 
two units' reactor coolant 
system caused both units to 
be in violation of technical 
specifications.  
4562003003 Organizational   
A vendor-supplied power 
calculation that was used for 
two units was found to be 
incorrect.  
4562005001 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of technical specifications for 
two units' containment 
penetrations caused both 
units to be in violation of 
technical specifications.  
4562008001 Organizational   
An analysis that was used for 
the auxiliary feedwater 
system on two units was 
found to be incorrect.  
4562010006 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of two units' component 
cooling system caused both 
units' technical specifications 
to be inaccurate.  
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4562010007 Organizational   
Vendor-supplied guidance 
that was used for calculations 
for two units was found to be 
incorrect.  
4562011004 Organizational   
A high-energy line break 
analysis that was used for two 
units was found to be 
incorrect.  
4572010002 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
4982002002 Organizational   
An analysis that was used for 
setpoints for two units was 
found to be inadequate.  
4982003006 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
inadequate. 
5282000003 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
5282000004 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
5282001002 Organizational   
A test methodology that was 
used for three units was 
found to be inadequate.  
5282004005 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on two units were found to be 
deficient.  
5282004009 Organizational   
Inadequate understanding of 
the design of three units led 
to all units' emergency core 
cooling system to have 
potentially been unable to 
fulfill their safety function.  
5282005003 Organizational   
Vendor-supplied guidance 
that was used to calculate 
setpoints for three units was 
found to be incorrect.  
5282007003 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on three units were found to 
be deficient.  
5282007004 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on three units were found to 
be deficient.  
Page | 82  
 
LER Number Classification Subclass Summary 
5282007005 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on three units were found to 
be deficient.  
5282009003 Organizational   
Symmetrical procedures used 
on three units were found to 
be deficient.  
5282010002 Organizational   
A calculation that was used 
for three units was found to 
be incorrect.  
5292005005 Organizational   
A design analysis that was 
used for two units was found 
to be inadequate.  
2542000002 Organizational   
Inadequate documentation 
caused two units to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
4542010001 Organizational   
An inadequate understanding 
of two units' component 
cooling system caused both 
units' technical specifications 
to be inaccurate.  
32008001 Proximity   
Contraband was attempted to 
be brought onto a three-unit 
site.  
2602001004 Proximity   
Control room habitability was 
breached because a door was 
blocked opened. 
2662000004 Proximity   
A location was identified that 
could prevent two units from 
safely shutting down if a fire 
occurred in the area.  
2662007006 Proximity   
It was identified that fire 
damage in the cable 
spreading room may prevent 
the ability to safely shutdown 
two units. 
2662010005 Proximity   
Multiple high-energy line 
break barriers for two units 
were not controlled.  
2692000007 Proximity   A radioactive source was lost onsite.  
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2692002002 Proximity   
An engineering evaluation 
identified the potential for an 
adverse valve actuation on 
three units during a design 
basis fire. 
2692003001 Proximity   
An engineering evaluation 
identified the potential for an 
adverse valve actuation on 
three units during a design 
basis fire. 
2812006002 Proximity   
An unexpected steam valve 
opening caused siding to 
detach and contact 
transformer components. This 
ultimately led to a loss of 
offsite power that affected 
two units.  
2822009001 Proximity   
Inadequate analysis of hot 
shorts led to scenarios by 
which postulated fires could 
affect two units.  
2822009009 Proximity   A radioactive source was lost onsite.  
2822010003 Proximity   
Battery room door seals for 
two units were found to be 
inadequate for postulated 
flooding scenarios. 
2952007001 Proximity   A radioactive source was lost onsite.  
3522005001 Proximity   A radioactive source was lost onsite.  
4132002005 Proximity   A radioactive source was lost onsite.  
4132004003 Proximity   
Inadequate analysis of hot 
shorts led to scenarios by 
which postulated fires could 
affect two units.  
4242006003 Proximity   
A contract employee was 
given unescorted access to a 
site without self-disclosing 
material information.  
Page | 84  
 
LER Number Classification Subclass Summary 
5282006007 Proximity   
The closure of a cubicle door 
cause a loss of offsite power 
on two units, which in turn, 
caused their emergency diesel 
generators to start.  
2372002002 Shared SSC Single 
The smoke purge mode for 
the control room emergency 
ventilation system was found 
to prevent the system, which 
is common to two units, from 
performing its safety 
function. 
2372002003 Shared SSC Single 
Manual valve failures 
prevented the cooling water 
flow to the control room 
refrigeration-condensing unit, 
which is common to two 
units.  
2372002004 Shared SSC Single 
The control room ventilation 
ductwork, which is common 
to two units, was breached 
causing the control room 
ventilation system to be 
inoperable.  
2372006005 Shared SSC Single 
The emergency ventilation air 
conditioning system, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable. 
2372008003 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
ventilation air conditioning 
system, which is common to 
two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2502010004 Shared SSC Single 
A radiation monitor that is 
common to two units was 
found to be inoperable.  
2542000008 Shared SSC Single 
Secondary containment, 
which is common to two 
units, was found to be 
breached.  
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2542005006 Shared SSC Single 
A control room emergency 
ventilation air conditioning 
compressor failed. The 
control room emergency 
ventilation air system is 
common to two units.  
2542007003 Shared SSC Single 
The control room ventilation 
system, which is common to 
two units, was found to be 
unable to perform its safety 
function.  
2542008001 Shared SSC Single 
The safe shutdown makeup 
pump, which is common to 
two units, was found to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
2542011003 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
ventilation air conditioning 
system, which is common to 
two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2592009003 Shared SSC Single 
The shared standby gas 
treatment system relay failed, 
causing the standby gas 
treatment system to be 
inoperable for three units. 
2602003005 Shared SSC Single 
A shutdown bus, which 
supplies power to two units' 
equipment, was temporarily 
de-energized. 
2602005006 Shared SSC Single 
A low voltage on shutdown 
battery cells caused two units 
to be in violation of technical 
specifications.  
2652000001 Shared SSC Single 
A malfunctioning valve 
caused the safe shutdown 
makeup pump on two units to 
be inoperable.  
2662000003 Shared SSC Single 
Inadequate controls were 
found on a temporary 
penetration for the cable 
spreading room, which has 
cables for two units.  
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2662006001 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
ventilation filtration system, 
which is common to two 
units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2692000002 Shared SSC Single 
The control room cooling 
chiller, which is common to 
three units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2692000003 Shared SSC Single 
The control room cooling 
chiller, which is common to 
three units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2692004004 Shared SSC Single 
The control room ventilation 
system booster fan, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable.  
2692005001 Shared SSC Single 
The emergency power path 
auxiliary power source, 
which is shared by three 
units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2692006003 Shared SSC Single 
Foreign material was found in 
suction piping, which could 
have adversely affected 
reactor building spray pumps 
on three units.  
2692009001 Shared SSC Single 
Spent fuel assemblies were 
found to be improperly stored 
in a spent fuel pool that is 
shared by two units.  
2692011003 Shared SSC Single 
The standby shutdown 
facility, which is shared by 
three units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2722001005 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
air intake dampers, which are 
common to two units, were 
found to be inoperable.  
2752001002 Shared SSC Single 
A differential relay tripped 
which caused the emergency 
diesel generators at two units 
to start.  
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2752006001 Shared SSC Single 
An unusually large number of 
dead birds were found on the 
bar racks associated with the 
cooling water intake for two 
units.  
2752011006 Shared SSC Single 
The control room envelope, 
which is common to two 
units, was lost. 
2752011007 Shared SSC Single 
The control room envelope, 
which is common to two 
units, was found to be 
inadequate. 
2752011008 Shared SSC Single 
A design vulnerability was 
found in the control room 
ventilation system, which is 
common to two units.  
2772003002 Shared SSC Single 
Inoperability of the standby 
gas treatment filter train, 
which is used for two units, 
caused a condition that is 
prohibited by technical 
specifications. 
2772006004 Shared SSC Single 
A flooding vulnerability was 
found in the emergency diesel 
generator building carbon 
dioxide suppression room, 
which is common to two 
units.  
2772010002 Shared SSC Single 
An improperly fastened rod 
hanger resulted in the 
inoperability of a subsystem 
of the emergency service 
water, which is a system 
common to two units.  
2772011005 Shared SSC Single 
The qualified offsite power 
circuit, which is common to 
two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2802000002 Shared SSC Single 
The effect of ventilation fans 
on the control room 
boundary, which is common 
to two units, resulted in a 
technical specification 
violation.  
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2802001002 Shared SSC Single 
The control room chillers 
breakers, which are common 
to two units, were found to 
have an improper trip rating.  
2802005002 Shared SSC Single 
Radiation monitors that are 
common to two units were 
found to be inoperable.  
2802008002 Shared SSC Single 
A failure of a breaker failure 
lockout relay resulted in a 
simulated loss of offsite 
power, which caused two 
units' emergency diesel 
generators to start.  
2802009001 Shared SSC Single 
An emergency service water 
pump, which services two 
units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2802009002 Shared SSC Single 
An emergency service water 
pump, which services two 
units, was found to be 
susceptible to flooding.  
2812003001 Shared SSC Single 
A shorted main generator 
lead caused automatic 
actuations on two units.  
2822000005 Shared SSC Single 
The cooling water strainer 
backwash valves, which are 
common to two units, were 
not tested.  
2822002001 Shared SSC Single 
The auxiliary building special 
vent zone boundary, which is 
shared by two units, was 
found to be degraded.  
2952011001 Shared SSC Single 
A fuel rod storage canister 
was found to be improperly 
stored in a spent fuel pool 
that is shared by two units.  
3012006002 Shared SSC Single 
Spent fuel assemblies were 
found to be improperly stored 
in a spent fuel pool that is 
shared by two units.  
3012011003 Shared SSC Single 
The removal of a safeguards 
rack caused standby 
emergency power for two 
units to be inoperable.  
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3132001003 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
ventilation system radiation 
monitors, which are common 
to two units, were found to be 
inoperable.  
3152000005 Shared SSC Single 
The auxiliary building crane 
was operated over the spent 
fuel pool, which is shared by 
two units, without proper 
alignment of the spent fuel 
ventilation system.  
3152001005 Shared SSC Single 
The rod control cluster 
assembly was operated in 
violation of technical 
specifications over the spent 
fuel pool, which is shared by 
two units.  
3152003003 Shared SSC Single 
Two units had to be shut 
down because of macro 
fouling in the shared intake. 
3162000011 Shared SSC Single 
The spent fuel exhaust 
ventilation system, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable.  
3172006001 Shared SSC Single 
An emergency diesel 
generator tripped causing two 
units to be in violation of 
technical specifications.  
3172011002 Shared SSC Single 
A diesel generator battery 
charger failed causing two 
units to be in violation of 
technical specifications.  
3172011003 Shared SSC Single 
An emergency diesel 
generator was found to be 
inoperable causing two units 
to be in violation of technical 
specifications.  
3212006004 Shared SSC Single 
A lack of understanding of 
the design caused the control 
room boundary, which is 
common to two units, to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
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3212009006 Shared SSC Single 
The main control room air 
conditioner, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable.  
3212010002 Shared SSC Single 
The main control room air 
conditioner, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable.  
3212010003 Shared SSC Single 
The main control room 
environmental control system 
boundary, which is common 
to two units, was found to not 
be single failure proof as 
required.  
3252000002 Shared SSC Single 
A small amount of chlorine 
gas escaped the chlorination 
system and caused the control 
room emergency ventilation 
system, which is common to 
two units, to actuate.  
3252000003 Shared SSC Single 
A small amount of chlorine 
gas escaped the chlorination 
system and caused the control 
room emergency ventilation 
system, which is common to 
two units, to actuate. 
3252005004 Shared SSC Single 
A loss of electrical power to 
an emergency bus, along with 
an air compressor failure, 
caused the control room 
emergency ventilation 
systems, which is common to 
two units, to be inoperable.  
3252006001 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
ventilation and air 
conditioning, which is 
common to two units, were 
found to be inoperable.  
3252006003 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
ventilation, which is common 
to two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
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3252006005 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
ventilation, which is common 
to two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
3252007001 Shared SSC Single 
A crosstie breaker, which is 
used by two units, was found 
to be inoperable.  
3252008002 Shared SSC Single 
The control room air 
conditioning system, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable.  
3252008004 Shared SSC Single 
A control room emergency 
ventilation subsystem did not 
perform as expected in a 
post-maintenance test, 
causing entry into a limiting 
condition of operation for two 
units.  
3272009006 Shared SSC Single 
The auxiliary building gas 
treatment system, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable.  
3272009008 Shared SSC Single 
Spent fuel assemblies were 
found to be improperly stored 
in a spent fuel pool that is 
shared by two units.  
3272011001 Shared SSC Single 
The control room air 
conditioning system, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable.  
3342008001 Shared SSC Single 
The control room envelope 
intake, which is common to 
two units, was found to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
3382002001 Shared SSC Single 
The waste gas decay tank 
oxygen analyzer, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be in violation of 
technical specifications.  
3522005002 Shared SSC Single 
A trip of a transformer caused 
the trip of an offsite power 
source, which caused 
automatic actuation of two 
units' components.  
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3522006001 Shared SSC Single 
A spurious actuation of the 
fire suppression system 
caused the trip of an offsite 
power source, which caused 
automatic actuation of two 
units' components.  
3522006004 Shared SSC Single 
A faulty calculation that was 
used for a voltage regulator 
could have resulted in the 
loss of two offsite circuits.  
3612000003 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
air cleanup system, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to have operated 
outside of the design basis.  
3612000005 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
air cleanup system, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be outside of its 
design basis.  
3612000010 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
cleanup system, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to not be seismically 
qualified.  
3612001003 Shared SSC Single 
One train of the control room 
emergency cleanup system, 
which is shared by two units, 
was found to be inoperable.  
3612005003 Shared SSC Single 
Relay setting for the degraded 
grid voltage protection 
system could have caused 
early separation from offsite 
power for two units. 
3612007006 Shared SSC Single 
A loose electrical connection 
caused the emergency chilled 
water system, which is shared 
by two units, to be 
inoperable.  
3692009001 Shared SSC Single 
The nuclear service water 
system, which is common to 
two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
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3692010001 Shared SSC Single 
The control room area chilled 
water system, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable.  
3692011001 Shared SSC Single 
Two units had to be shut 
down because of macro 
fouling in the shared intake. 
3732005001 Shared SSC Single 
A single failure vulnerability 
of a current transformer was 
found that would have caused 
a loss of offsite power at two 
units.  
3872000010 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
outside air supply, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable.  
3872002001 Shared SSC Single 
The control structure chiller, 
which is common to two 
units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
3872003002 Shared SSC Single 
The standby gas treatment 
system, which is common to 
two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
3872003003 Shared SSC Single 
The standby gas treatment 
system, which is common to 
two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
3872003004 Shared SSC Single 
The control room emergency 
outside air supply and the 
control room floor cooling 
system, which are common to 
two units, were found to be 
inoperable.  
3872008001 Shared SSC Single 
High exhaust radiation 
monitors, which are common 
to two units, were found to be 
inoperable.  
4132000003 Shared SSC Single 
The control room ventilation 
system, which is common to 
two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
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4132001003 Shared SSC Single 
The control room ventilation 
system, which is common to 
two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
4132003002 Shared SSC Single 
The loss of a vital inverter 
caused the nuclear service 
water system, which is shared 
by two units, to be 
inoperable.  
4132007004 Shared SSC Single 
The control room area chilled 
water system, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable.  
4452001002 Shared SSC Single 
The primary plant ventilation 
system, which is common to 
two units, was found to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
4452003004 Shared SSC Single 
The control room air 
conditioning system, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable.  
4462010001 Shared SSC Single 
A fault occurred on a startup 
transformer that caused 
automatic actuations on two 
units.  
4542000002 Shared SSC Single 
The control room ventilation 
system, which is common to 
two units, was found to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
4542005005 Shared SSC Single 
Improper tank cleaning 
caused the ultimate heat sink 
water makeup system, which 
is common to two units to be 
inoperable. 
4542007002 Shared SSC Single 
An ultimate heat sink pipe 
leak, which is common to two 
units, caused both units to 
shut down due to technical 
specification requirements.  
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4562003001 Shared SSC Single 
The unit common control 
room ventilation system 
filtration system actuation 
instrumentation radiation 
monitors, which are common 
to two units, were found to be 
inoperable.  
4562006002 Shared SSC Single 
The main control room 
ventilation envelope, which is 
common to two units, was 
found to be inoperable.  
4562010005 Shared SSC Single 
The control room outside air 
intake, which is common to 
two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
4982010004 Shared SSC Single 
A switchyard bus de-
energized causing a loss of 
offsite power for two units.  
5282007002 Shared SSC Single 
An unanalyzed condition 
during a control room fire 
caused three units to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
5282011001 Shared SSC Single 
A protective relay actuation 
on a startup transformer 
caused a loss of offsite power 
on two units.  
5282011003 Shared SSC Single 
A control room essential 
filtration misalignment 
caused three units to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
2662001004 Shared SSC Standby 
Redundant standby 
emergency power supplies 
were not started in 
compliance with technical 
specifications.  
3272010001 Shared SSC Standby 
A common spare breaker was 
incorrectly installed, which 
caused two units to be in 
violation of technical 
specifications.  
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3872007001 Shared SSC Standby 
An emergency service water 
pump was automatically 
started due to improper 
alignment of the standby 
diesel generator.  
2372009003 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
An emergency diesel 
generator, which is shared by 
two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2502004001 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
Two emergency diesel 
generators, which can be used 
by two units, were found to 
be inoperable.  
2502005006 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
An auxiliary feedwater pump, 
which is shared by two units, 
was found to be inoperable.  
2542000001 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
An emergency diesel 
generator, which is shared by 
two units, was inadvertently 
started.  
2542005002 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
An emergency bus, which 
was cross-tied, tripped 
causing power to be lost to 
two units' emergency power. 
2592011002 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
A loss of safety function 
occurred when an emergency 
diesel generator that is shared 
by two units lost power.  
2662001002 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
The use of an interlock defeat 
switch in certain scenarios 
was found to violate two 
units' technical specifications.  
2662001005 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
The auxiliary feedwater 
system, which is shared by 
two units, was found to have 
a potential vulnerability. 
2662001006 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
An unanalyzed condition 
during a fire could have 
caused two units' shared 
auxiliary feedwater systems 
to be inoperable.  
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2662002003 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
Partial clogging of 
recirculation orifices could 
have caused the auxiliary 
feedwater system, which is 
shared by two units, to be 
inoperable.  
2772000004 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
A malfunctioning valve 
caused the emergency service 
water system, which is used 
by two units, to have 
inadequate flow.  
2772005003 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
An emergency diesel 
generator that can be used by 
two units was not in 
compliance with technical 
specifications.  
2772011003 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
A delayed relay operation 
caused an emergency diesel 
generator, which is common 
to two units, to automatically 
start.  
2772011004 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
An emergency diesel 
generator, which is shared by 
two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2802001001 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
An emergency diesel 
generator, which is shared by 
two units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2802005003 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
An emergency service water 
pump, which is shared by two 
units, was found to be 
inoperable.  
2802006001 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
The auxiliary feedwater 
system, which is the same 
design on two units, was 
found to have a design error 
by which certain postulated 
single failure accidents could 
render the system inoperable. 
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2822000003 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
An unanalyzed condition 
could have caused the 
essential service (cooling) 
water system, which is shared 
by two units, to be 
inoperable.  
2822010001 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
An unanalyzed condition 
could have caused the cooling 
water system, which is shared 
by two units, to be 
inoperable.  
3252009002 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
The loss of power to an 
emergency bus caused 
automatic system actuations 
on two units.  
3382003005 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
The inoperability of a 
hydrogen recombiner caused 
two units to be in violation of 
technical specifications.  
3692010004 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
Two sub-trains of the starting 
air system for the emergency 
diesel generators for two 
units were cross-tied without 
complying with the Technical 
Specifications.  
3872007002 Shared SSC Time Sequential 
The residual heat removal 
system, which is shared by 
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